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Abstract
Today, FPGAs are still often used as prototyping devices. With the latest
technologies to produce these devices, FPGAs are becoming larger and faster.
With the correct development environments, FPGAs can also be used in end
products to provide specialised features that are not always possible with ASIC
chips such as in-field updates of hardware.
The contributions of this thesis start with implementations of cryptographic
primitives. These implementations focus on using minimal resources and are
uniformly wrapped to improve interconnectivity and interchangeability between
components. Secondly, by using these primitives, we manage to realise the
first single-chip, secure, and remote reconfiguration of an FPGA in the field.
This is achieved by implementing a cryptographic protocol in combination
with bitstream compression. The next contribution is made in realising a
proof-of-concept implementation of a licensing scheme for hardware IP cores.
We managed this by using a novel storage technique in combination with an
academic tool. Our final contribution is in strengthening an existing distributed
logging scheme, by moving the sensitive storage from server to FPGA. The
reduction in communication overhead is achieved by using the cryptographic
implementations on the FPGA to perform the calculations on the sensitive data.
When implementing applications that contain cryptographic components, a
number of different fields of research come together. The most important
research fields that meet in such an implementation focus on cryptology,
hardware design, system-on-chip and design tools exploration. We tried
to combine the evolutions in these different fields of research into our
implementations.
iii

Beknopte samenvatting
FPGA’s worden vandaag nog altijd vaak gebruikt voor het maken van prototypes.
Met de nieuwste technologieën om FPGA’s te maken, worden deze devices almaar
groter en sneller. Met de juiste ontwikkelomgevingen kunnen FPGA’s ingezet
worden in eindproducten om hierin functionaliteiten aan te bieden die met op
maat gemaakte chips niet altijd mogelijk zijn zoals bijv. updates van hardware,
na ingebruikstelling.
De bijdragen van dit proefschrift beginnen met de implementatie van
cryptografische primitieven. Deze implementaties richten zich op het mini-
male gebruik van middelen en hebben een uniforme interface welke de
interconnectiviteit en onderlinge uitwisselbaarheid verbeteren. Als tweede
bijdrage slagen we er in om, met het gebruik van deze primitieven, de eerste
single-chip, veilige FPGA-herconfiguratie van op een afstand uit te voeren.
Dit wordt bereikt door het implementeren van een cryptografisch protocol in
combinatie met bitstream-compressie. De volgende bijdrage situeert zich in
het realiseren van een proof-of-concept implementatie van een licentiesysteem
voor hardware-componenten. We zijn hierin geslaagd door middel van een
nieuwe opslag-techniek en het gebruik van een academische tool. Onze laatste
bijdrage is het versterken van een bestaand gedistribueerd logging concept
door het verplaatsen van de opslag van gevoelige gegevens van de server naar
FPGA. De vermindering in communicatie-overhead wordt mogelijk gemaakt door
cryptografische implementaties op de FPGA te gebruiken voor de berekeningen
op de gevoelige gegevens.
Wanneer toepassingen geïmplementeerd worden die cryptografische aspecten
bevatten, komen uiteenlopende onderzoeksdomeinen samen. De belangrijkste
domeinen hierbij, richten zich op cryptologie, hardware ontwerp, system-
on-chip en ontwikkelomgeving verkenning. Wij hebben geprobeerd om de
evoluties in deze verschillende onderzoeksdomeinen samen te brengen in onze
implementaties.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter situates the research of this thesis. After giving a motivating
example, it introduces the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), for which
this research is tailored. As the contributions of this research are focused on
cryptographic implementations and their applications, it subsequently provides
the reader with a cryptologic background. Finally it makes a summary of the
contributions of this work and presents an overview of the upcoming chapters.
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Motivating example
In August 1955, Life Magazine published an article "Throwaway Living" in which
it first introduced the term throwaway society. Nowadays the term is known by
everyone and covers the excessive production of disposable items. With the fast
pace of technological evolution, this concept also applies to electronic devices.
Instead of forcing customers to upgrade their electronic devices, updating their
currently owned devices might be a more practical, ecological, and economical
solution.
Nowadays, applying this concept to software is something which everyone is
familiar with. A look at the brief history of game consoles illustrates this.
In Figure 1.1 a console is shown for the popular game ‘Donkey Kong Jr.’ which
was released in 1982. On this mobile console only the ‘Donkey Kong Jr.’ game
could be played. Four years later the game was available for the Nintendo
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Figure 1.1: The wide-screen Donkey
Kong Jr. console
Figure 1.2: The Nintendo Entertain-
ment System
Entertainment System, shown in Figure 1.2. This 8-bit video console could
be used to play various games that could be loaded through a cartridge or a
‘Game Pak’, a picture of which is shown in Figure 1.3. This shift allowed users
to own a single device on which many games could be played by replacing the
software that ran on the microprocessor. The Game Pak contained a printed
circuit board which mainly held a ROM with the game’s code. Updating the
running program, or at least a part of it, could easily be done by physically
switching the Game Pak.
With the growth of gaming on personal computers, large groups of users switched
platform, but the external software storage remained. Games were to be bought
and physically connected to the platform. Approximately seventeen years
after the release of the Nintendo Entertainment System, the Steam platform
was released in 2003 by Valve Corporation (Figure 1.4). This platform offers,
amongst other core features, a digital distribution channel. Steam users can
simply buy and download games from the Internet to the computer, thus
avoiding the physical intervention of external memory.
This evolution in software could be followed by hardware: moving from a
device with a sole purpose to a device with a programmable processor, that can
be altered to serve multiple purposes or to be updated, without the physical
intervention of a technician.
1.1.2 Reconfigurable hardware
Devices of which the hardware can be altered in the field, could prolong the
life-cycle of a product or could combine the core tasks of multiple products.
Achieving such goals could contribute to converting the throwaway society into
a more ecological reconfig-and-replay society. In order to achieve this, there is
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Figure 1.3: A Donkey Kong Game
Pak for the Nintendo Entertainment
System
Figure 1.4: The logo of Steam,
released by Valve Corporation in
2003
a need for hardware which can be easily updated.
Apart from prolonging the life span of a product, a more dynamic use of
the reconfigurable property of reconfigurable devices can broaden the type of
applications which can benefit from reconfigurable hardware. For example,
although using dedicated hardware as co-processors is not ground-breaking,
being able to update them is not so common. This would be a welcome feature for
co-processors in fields that evolute at a fast pace, such as cryptography. Another
example is the use of Intellectual Property (IP) cores. With reconfigurable
hardware, the flexible usage of IP cores becomes possible. This flexibility can
be reflected in: obtaining IP cores, tracking IP core copies, or even renting IP
cores for the usage of certain amount of time or number of uses.
With the setting of devices that contain reconfigurable hardware already
deployed in the field, securing the communication with such a device becomes a
necessity.
Academic research in fields as hardware reconfiguration, cryptography, IP core
management, and hardware implementations goes very broad and very deep.
More scarce is the research focusing on combining these different fields into
a single, viable solution. This thesis tries to fill this gap by tackling three
issues that require configurable hardware security, namely secure logging, secure
remote configuration and secure IP core licensing.
To achieve reconfigurable devices in the future, this research uses a Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) as hardware platform. The FPGA is
thoroughly discussed in Section 1.2. To provide the reader with a basic
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background on cryptology, Section 1.3 introduces the most relevant concepts,
primitives, mathematical principles and physical attacks. Finally this chapter
summarises the contributions of this dissertation in Section 1.4, Section 1.5 gives
an overview of the remainder of this manuscript, and Section 1.6 summarises
the conclusions of this chapter.
1.2 Field Programmable Gate Array
The name Field Programmable Gate Array was used for the first time in 1985. It
was developed by Ross Freeman and Bernard Vonderschmitt who founded Xilinx
in 1984, together with Jim Barnett. At that time, the name quite accurately
described what the chip was: a gate array that could be programmed in the
field, and of which the gate connections are programmable as well. Almost
twenty years later, an FPGA contains huge amounts of programmable gates,
together with a wide variety of dedicated cores.
1.2.1 FPGA technology
An FPGA consists for a very large part out of reconfigurable blocks for the
implementation of logical functions and switch matrices for routing. To impose a
certain behaviour on the FPGA, the reconfigurable blocks have to be configured.
The file that contains this configuration is referred to as a bitstream. The
technology to store the configuration determines the technology of the FPGA.
Analysis of the current FPGA market shows the three most common technologies
are:
SRAM-based FPGAs store the configuration in static random-access mem-
ory (SRAM) cells. These FPGAs need to be reconfigured at each start-up
due to the volatile nature of the memory. The static power consumption
of an SRAM-based FPGA is relatively high.
Flash-based FPGAs store the configuration in an EEPROM-based Flash
memory. Because Flash memory is non-volatile, these FPGAs keep their
configuration at start-up, but are less appropriate for a large amount of
reconfigurations. The Flash-based FPGA does not require a permanent
power supply, which lowers the static power consumption.
Antifuse-based FPGAs store the configuration by making permanent
connections. These FPGAs cannot be reconfigured, but allow higher
clock-rates. The Antifuse-based FPGA consumes the least static power
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since the low impedance metal contact of an Antifuse connection causes
less power loss than a switched-on transistor.
Apart from the maximum number of reconfigurations, static power consumption
is a major difference between these different FPGA technologies. Additionally,
it is pointed out that on power-up the SRAM-based FPGA will draw an inrush
current, because the N-MOS and P-MOS transistors are both in a low impedance
state, which introduces a delay before the SRAM can be programmed. This
delay is non-existing in Antifuse or Flash-based FPGAs, which are ‘live upon
start-up’.
Figure 1.5 shows the market shares of the three largest FPGA vendors in 2013,
based on their yearly revenue. As can be seen in Table 1.1, this roughly indicates
that over 90% of all FPGAs are SRAM based.
Figure 1.5: FPGA market shares 2013
Table 1.1: Overview of the available FPGAs of the most important vendors
based on the technology
Xilinx Altera Lattice Microsemi
SRAM 3 3 3 3
Flash 7 7 7 3
Antifuse 7 7 7 3
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Until recently Xilinx offered two main lines of FPGAs: the Virtex FPGAs and
the Spartan FPGAs. The former were the high-end devices, while the latter
were the cheaper low-end devices. In the most recent Xilinx FPGA family, the
28 nm technology based 7-series, the Spartan-line FPGA is replaced by two
similar new lines: the Kintex FPGAs and the Artix FPGAs of which the latter
is a more power-friendly sibling.
In this work, we use SRAM FPGAs because of their ubiquity. Moreover, dynamic
and partial reconfiguration is only supported in SRAM-based FPGAs. Because
partial reconfiguration is important for this work, all targeted devices in this
work are Xilinx products. This vendor introduced the partial reconfiguration
technique and has been supporting it for more than a decade.
1.2.2 The configuration of an FPGA
As mentioned above, the FPGA gets its configuration through a bitstream. This
section describes how a bitstream is generated for Xilinx FPGAs and how this
bitstream configures the FPGA.
Bitstream generation
The first step in the creation of a bitstream is to describe the design in a Hardware
Description Language such as: VHDL, Verilog or SystemC, or through schematic
entry. The design has to go through the synthesis tool to be transformed into
a netlist (a .ngc file). This netlist then gets combined with any other cores in
the Build step, which results in a .ngd file. This .ngd file contains a logical
description in terms of logic elements such as AND gates, flip-flops, and similar
gates. Thereafter, this .ngd file gets mapped on the hardware primitives, which
are the building blocks of the reconfigurable fabric of the targeted FPGA,
resulting in a .ncd file. The subsequent step is to place and route (PAR) the
mapped design. Placing is determining where each primitive from the mapping
phase is placed on the chip, while routing tries to make every required connection
through the routing lines on the chip. These steps result in a routed .ncd file
which, finally, can be used to generate a bitstream for the FPGA. These different
processing steps and the corresponding file extensions are shown in Figure 1.6.
Although the FPGA vendor provides the system designer with the required
tools to run each of the above mentioned steps, other commercially available
tools exist to perform the synthesis step. Although these tools achieve better
results, the license price is also of a different magnitude.
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synthesis build MAP PAR bitgen
.vhdl .ngc .ngd .ncd _routed.ncd .bit
Figure 1.6: The processing steps with the corresponding file extensions of the
bitstream generation process
FPGA configuration
By loading the configuration memory with a bitstream, the behaviour of the
reconfigurable fabric is determined. Commonly an FPGA is configured in its
entirety, but partial reconfiguration is a technique that allows the reconfiguration
of a certain partition of an FPGA. A bitstream that contains the configuration
of a partition of the FPGA is referred to as a partial bitstream. The partition
that stays unchanged is referred to as the ‘static partition’ while the one or more
other partitions are referred as ‘reconfigurable partition(s)’. If the operation of
the static partition continues uninterruptedly during the reconfiguration this is
referred to as ‘dynamic’ partial reconfiguration. The three different approaches
to reconfigure an FPGA are shown in Figure 1.7. The possibility exists to
use encrypted bitstreams to configure FPGAs without revealing the bitstream.
An on-chip decryption core is present to perform bitstream decryption, but
up to the latest Xilinx-series [82, 83] this feature is not available for partial
bitstreams. Moreover, this decryption core is not available for any purpose
other than bitstream decryption.
device holds no configuration
device in a configured,
but inactive state
time
config A
config A config A'
no 
functionality
here
config A”
config Bconfig A
config A”
Full configuration
     or                   
full reconfiguration
Partial reconfiguration 
Dynamic, partial reconfiguration
Figure 1.7: Three different approaches to reconfigure an FPGA
Table 1.4, at page 25, summarises which recent Xilinx FPGA families offer
certain features related to secure (re-)configuration. This table shows that data
authentication is only available in the Virtex-6 and the 7-series. The purpose of
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this authentication is twofold. The first purpose is to provide a mechanism that
verifies that the FPGA configuration is exactly the same as the intended FPGA
configuration. This detects tampering. The second purpose is to guarantee that
this configuration originates from a trusted origin. Data authentication and
other terminology are further explained in Section 1.3.1.
1.2.3 The anatomy of the targeted devices
This research is targeted at two different devices: the XC5VFX70T and the
XCS6LX45. The XC5VFX70T is a Virtex-5 family member, which targets
high-performance embedded systems with advanced serial connectivity [78], and
the Spartan-6 XCS6LX45, which targets high-volume applications requiring
leading system integration capabilities with the lowest total cost [79]. Both
FPGAs’ Configuration Logic Blocks (CLB), shown in Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9,
visualise how the switch matrices are connected to a single CLB. For both
devices, each CLB holds two slices. The main difference between these CLBs is
the CIN and COUT connection through the right slice, which is only available
in the Virtex-5 family. These dedicated connections are to route carry logic
which is frequently used in arithmetic operations.
Switch
Matrix
CLB                                
Slice(0)
Slice(1)
Cout          Cout
Cin            Cin
Figure 1.8: The CLB of a Virtex-5
FPGA
Switch
Matrix
CLB                                
Slice(0)
Slice(1)
Cout          
Cin            
Figure 1.9: The CLB of a Spartan-6
FPGA
Although the content of the CLBs shown in Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9 look
very similar, the content of their slices differs significantly, as summarised
in Table 1.3. This table gives the different types of available slices for each
targeted device. The Slice-L and Slice-M both offer support for arithmetic
circuits using carry chains whereof Slice-M additionally provides distributed
memory functionality. The more light-weight Slice-X is only available in the
Spartan-6 devices. Although the Spartan devices have larger look-up tables
(LUT) and more flip-flops (FF) in their slices, the high-end Virtex devices have
much more slices.
FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAY 9
The LUT is the smallest building block to provide reconfigurable ‘gates’. An
n-input LUT can emulate every possible function with n inputs. This means
that each LUT can be configured to 22n different functions.
Table 1.2: The truth table for any 2-input function, where · is a logical AND, +
is a logical OR, ⊕ is an exclusive OR, and an overlined character represents an
inverted value.
A B F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
‘0’ A ·B A ·B A A ·B B A⊕B A+B
F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
A+B A⊕B B A+B A A+B A ·B ‘1’
As mentioned above, the FPGAs of today also contain a wide variety of dedicated
cores on the FPGA die1. Although the details may vary between different
vendors’ products, most of these cores can be found somewhere in each vendors’
offering. The most relevant cores are explained here and are also taken up in
Table 1.3.
BRAM The Block Random Access Memory (BRAM) cores are dedicated
memory cores. These cores can be configured to have different length
and depth configurations. A single 18 Kibit BRAM can, for example,
be configured as a memory offering 1024 addresses which each can store
an 18-bit value, while it can also be configured as a memory with 8192
locations for 2-bit values. The targeted devices both provide the feature
to have a dual-ported BRAM which offers two independent read-and-write
ports on the same memory space. BRAMs can also be configured as
FIFOs.
1A die is a small piece of semiconducting material on which a circuit is implemented.
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DSP slices The Digital Signal Processing (DSP) slices are able to implement
certain mathematical functions very fast because of their dedicated nature.
These functions can be used to configure an adder, a multiplier, a
48-bit logic operation block or other mathematical or logical function.
As an example of a simplified operation, the functions can be fit to:
O = (Z ± (X + Y + Cin) OR (−Z + (X + Y + Cin))), to implement a
three input adder.
DCM The Digital Clock Manager (DCM) is a core that provides the possibility
to change between or provide multiple clock domains. The use of a DCM
minimises clock skew and duty cycle distortion.
Switch matrix A switch matrix provides programmable routing in the FPGA.
Horizontal and vertical wires cross each other in a switch matrix and,
depending on the SRAM configuration cell of the switch matrix, may
be interconnected and/or routed to a CLB. Thus, these switch matrices
interconnect the CLBs.
Table 1.3: Differences in slice content between the XC5VFX70T and the
XCS6LX45
Virtex-5 FX70T Spartan-6 LX45
L M X L M
share ±75%[63] ∓25%[63] 50% 25% 25%
LUT 6I 6I 6I 6I 6I
#FF 4 4 8 8 8
wide MUXes 3 3 7 3 3
carry logic 3 3 7 3 3
distributed RAM 7 3 7 7 3
shift registers 7 3 7 7 3
#slices 11 200 6 822
#LUT 44 800 54 576
#BRAM 148× 36 Kibit 116× 18 Kibit
#DSP1 128 58
#DCM 12 8
1DSP48Es for Virtex-5 and DSP48A1s for Spartan-6
X slice: basic Spartan-6 slice
L slice: a slice containing a carry structure and multipliers
M slice: an L slice with distributed RAM and shift registers
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1.3 A cryptologic backpack
This section presents the reader with general background on what cryptology
is and explains important concepts in Section 1.3.1. The most relevant
cryptographic primitives are explained more thoroughly in Section 1.3.2.
To implement certain primitives, mathematical systems are used for which
Section 1.3.3 provides the relevant algebraic background. Finally, Section 1.3.4
introduces physical attacks.
1.3.1 Cryptologic background
Cryptology is the study of secure communications and it covers both
cryptography and cryptanalysis. The former is the study on schemes to allow
secure communications, while the latter tries to break or avoid these schemes.
Cryptography relies on security primitives. In [45], Menezes et al. report three
main categories of security primitives: unkeyed primitives, public-key primitives
and symmetric-key primitives. Figure 1.10 shows which primitives belong to
these categories. For the sake of completeness, it is mentioned that symmetric-
key ciphers can be divided again into block ciphers and stream ciphers. Before
explaining these primitives, some important cryptographic concepts are defined
first. For more complete background information the reader can consult [43, 45].
- arbitrary length
  hash functions
- one-way permutations
- random sequences
- public-key ciphers
- digital signatures
- identification primitives
- symmetric-key ciphers
- arbitrary length
  hash functions (MACs)
- signatures
- pseudo-random 
  sequences
- identification primitives
unkeyed
primitives
public-key
primitives
symmetric-key
primitives
cryptographic primitives
Figure 1.10: The cryptographic primitives as discussed in [45]
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A number of important cryptologic concepts are described using Figure 1.11.
It is assumed that Alice and Bob want to have secure communication over
an unsecure channel, to which their adversary, Eve, has access. Six common
cryptographic goals are:
data confidentiality encompasses that the messages sent between Alice and
Bob, cannot be understood by Eve.
entity authentication or identification encompasses that Bob can be sure
the other entity is Alice and not Eve, possibly pretending to be Alice.
data-origin authentication encompasses that Bob can be sure the message
is sent by Alice.
data integrity encompasses that Bob can be sure the message is not tampered
with.
data authentication encompasses both data-origin authentication and data
integrity.
non-repudiation encompasses in one direction that Alice cannot deny having
sent a certain message and in the other direction that Bob cannot deny
having received a certain message.
Alice Bob
Eve
Figure 1.11: Entities
To achieve these goals, a cryptographic protocol is required. Such a protocol
is a well-defined procedure in which Alice and/or Bob send messages to each
other after performing operations on these messages. Protocols are studied
thoroughly in cryptography and exist in many different flavours. Often, these
protocols contain ‘encryption’. To be clear on what is covered by this and other
terms throughout this dissertation, some definitions are given.
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Encryption is the process in which a message is transformed in some
incomprehensible form. A message plainly readable to anyone is referred to as
the plain text, while an encrypted message is referred to as the cipher text.
The inverse transformation is decryption.
When both Alice and Bob use the same cryptographic key for the encryption and
decryption of a message, they use symmetric-key cryptography. Although
symmetric-key cryptography provides a solution for a number of cryptographic
concepts, securely establishing a situation where only Alice and Bob possess
the symmetric key is a huge challenge for large scale systems. Public-key
cryptography can be used to overcome this challenge by using key pairs for
every communicating entity. One key is kept private while the other key can be
made public.
1.3.2 Cryptographic primitives
The underlined primitives in Figure 1.10 are frequently used in this dissertation.
These primitives are elaborated on here.
A hash function
This unkeyed primitive is an algorithm that maps an input of an arbitrary
length to an output of a fixed length, called the ‘hash value’. Hash functions
used in cryptographic applications should have the following properties:
collision resistance ensures that it is hard to find any two distinct inputs
with the same hash.
pre-image resistance ensures that it is hard, given a hash value h, to find
an input x which has h as a hash.
second pre-image resistance ensures that it is hard, given an input x, to
find a second input y such that the hash of x is equal to the hash of y.
A hash-function is often used to generate a ‘message fingerprint’ of a message.
Random sequences
Random sequences are essential in cryptographic schemes. It should be infeasible
to predict the outcome of the random sequence. There are two different methods
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for generating random numbers: true random number generators and pseudo-
random number generators.
True random number generators start from a physical phenomenon which is
measured. It might be possible that taking these measurements introduces a
bias to the generated number. When this occurs it should be compensated for
with appropriate post-processing. Pseudo-random number generators follow
an algorithm which is initialised with a symmetric key or random seed. The
generator then produces seemingly random numbers.
Random numbers are, as an example, used in the generation of keys or for the
initialisation of a system.
A cipher
Figure 1.12 visualises a cipher which is used to encrypt (decrypt) messages.
The input of the cipher comes in from the left, while a key comes in from below.
The output will appear on the right side of the cipher. When the plain text
(cipher text) is input, the cipher performs encryption (decryption). Whether
the key is a private or symmetric key, determines if the cipher is referred to as
a public-key cipher or as a symmetric-key cipher, respectively.
CIPHER
input output
key
Figure 1.12: Cipher
As mentioned before, symmetric-key ciphers can be subdivided into block ciphers
and stream ciphers. Block ciphers take a block with a certain number of plain
text symbols to encrypt in one iteration to produce a block of cipher text, while
stream ciphers operate on a stream of single plain text symbols.
A message authentication code
As the name states, a message authentication code (MAC) is a string which
is used to authenticate a message. More strictly, the message is input for a
complex function together with a secret key. The result of the function is
A CRYPTOLOGIC BACKPACK 15
referred to as the MAC value and is typically combined with the message to
protect its authenticity.
A digital signature
A commonly known signature is a mechanism to bind an entity to a specific
piece of information. The digital equivalent of a signature is a digital
signature. Although both symmetric-key and public-key primitives can provide
digital signatures, public-key primitives have an advantage over symmetric-key
primitives. A public-key primitive would generate a signature on the message
with the private key, which everybody can verify with the according public key;
whereas with a symmetric-key primitive both the signer and the verifier use the
same key. The non-repudiation concept can be achieved through the former,
because there is only a single entity that can generate signatures.
1.3.3 Algebraic background
Because cryptographic primitives often make use of calculations in a finite field,
this section recapitulates the relevant algebraic structures: group, ring and field.
A ‘Group’ < A, · > is an algebraic structure that consists of a set of elements A
and an operation ·. For < A, · > to be a group, the four group axioms G1 - G4
have to hold.
G1 : A has closure under ·
∀x, y ∈ A : ∃z ∈ A;x · y = z
G2 : · has the associative property
∀x, y, z ∈ A : x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z
G3 : there is an (two-sided) identity (or neutral) element for · in A
∃!e ∈ A;∀x ∈ A : x · e = e · x = x
G4 : there is an (two-sided) inverse element for · in A
∀x ∈ A : ∃!x−1 ∈ A : x · x−1 = x−1 · x = e
If a group has a finite number of elements in its set A, it is referred to as finite
group where the number of elements is called the order of A. If the additional
axiom G5 is also met in a group < A, · >, this group is called an Abelian (or
commutative) group. The most common example of an Abelian group is the
set of integers under the addition operation.
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G5 : · has the commutative property
∀x, y ∈ A : x · y = y · x
A ‘Ring’ < A, ·,+ > is an algebraic structure which consists of a set of elements
A and two operations · and +. For < A, ·,+ > to be a ring, axioms R1 - R4
have to hold.
R1 : < A,+ > is an Abelian group
with ‘0’ as neutral element and ‘−a’ as inverse element
R2 : A has closure under ·
R3 : · has the associative property
R4 : · is distributive over the Abelian group operation (+)
∀x, y, z ∈ A : x · (y + z) = x · y + x · z
and
∀x, y, z ∈ A : (x+ y) · z = x · z + y · z
If the additional axiom R5 is also met, the ring < A, ·,+ > is called a
commutative ring. If axiom R6 holds in addition to R1 - R4, the ring < A, ·,+ >
is called a ‘ring with multiplicative identity’. When axioms R6 and R7 hold in
addition to R1 - R4, the ring < A, ·,+ > is called a ‘skew field’. Finally, when
the axioms R1 - R7 hold, the algebraic structure is called a ‘field’.
R5 : · has the commutative property
R6 : there is an (two-sided) identity element for · in A
R7 : there is an (two-sided) inverse element for · in A \ {0}
Moreover, if a field has a finite set of elements, it is referred to as a finite field
or a Galois Field (GF). A common example of a field is the set of real numbers,
with operations addition and multiplication.
Groups constructed using an elliptic curve
Koblitz [33] and Miller [48] introduced the use of elliptic curves for constructing
cryptographic primitives. These curves are defined over a finite field GF (p) by
Equation (1.1), where a and b are constants in GF (p) that satisfy Equation (1.2).
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (1.1)
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4a3 + 27b2 6≡ 0. (1.2)
The set of elements of the finite field are the points on the curve. To meet
requirement G3, an additional point O is required. This point is referred to
as ‘the point at infinity’ and is formulated as O = (x, 8). The complete set of
elements is hence defined by Equation (1.3).
E = {P = (x, y) | x, y ∈ GF (p) solved from (1.1)} ∪ {O}. (1.3)
The group operation is the elliptic curve point addition (ECPA). The ECPA
calculates the sum of two points according to Equation (1.4).
P3 = P1 + P2 = (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) = (x3, y3) (1.4)
with
x3 = (λ2 − x1 − x2)
y3 = ((x1 − x3) · λ− y1)
λ = y2 − y1
x2 − x1 .
The Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication (ECPM) is the multiplication of a scalar
k with a point P ∈ E. It can be calculated by subsequently adding the same
point k − 1 times. A more efficient approach is by using the ‘double-and-add’
method which is shown in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: ECPM using double-and-add
Input: point P , non-negative scalar k = (1kl−2...k1k0)
Output: point Q, with Q = kP
Q← P ;
for index in [(l − 2)..0] do
Q← 2Q;
if kindex = 1 then
Q← Q+ P ;
end
end
Montgomery presented a slightly different method in [50] which is shown in
Algorithm 2. Although this method is less efficient in terms of number of
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ALGORITHM 2: ECPM using a Montgomery ladder
Input: point P , non-negative scalar k = (1kl−2...k1k0)
Output: point Q, with Q = kP
Q← P ;
S ← 2P ;
for index in [(l − 2)..0] do
if kindex = 1 then
Q← Q+ S;
S ← 2S;
else
S ← Q+ S;
Q← 2Q;
end
end
operations, it results in a scalar-value independent run-time. The benefits from
this will be explained in Section 1.3.4.
Both in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 an elliptic curve point doubling (ECPD)
is used, which is a special case of a point addition. An ECPD can be calculated
according to Equation (1.5).
P3 = 2P1 = 2(x1, y1) = (x3, y3) (1.5)
with
x3 = (λ2 − 2 · x1)
y3 = ((x1 − x3) · λ− y1)
λ = 3 · x
2
1 + a
2 · y1 .
For a graphical representation of these operations and for a more in depth
explanation, [43] can be consulted.
NIST recommended curves
Elliptic curve computations consist of operations in the underlying finite field.
The most widely used fields are binary fields and prime fields, denoted by
GF (2n) and GF (p), respectively. Because the hardware implementation of
binary field operations results in carry-free logic, these fields are optimal for use
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in hardware in terms of speed and area. On the other hand, some cryptographic
algorithms also require modular operations over GF (p) next to the elliptic curve,
which makes GF (p) more attractive in terms of resource sharing.
In [60], NIST2 recommends the use of 15 different curves for elliptic curve
cryptography. For prime fields, there are five curves where the size of the prime
number is 192, 224, 256, 384, and 521 bits. For binary fields, there are five
fields with n equal to 163, 233, 283, 409, and 571. For every binary field, NIST
recommends one elliptic curve and one Koblitz curve3.
1.3.4 Physical attacks
Cryptanalysis can coarsely be divided into three groups: attacks on algorithms,
brute-force attacks and physical attacks. The first tries to exploit weaknesses in
algorithms and/or protocols. Mathematical proof together with large exposure
to possible threats could be an indication a certain algorithm or protocol is not
vulnerable to these types of attacks.
The second group of attacks tries to find a cryptographic key by systematically
trying every possibility for the key. This theoretically might require to check
every possible key in the search space. These attacks could be countered by
designing a large enough search space. This can be done by increasing the
alphabets and the lengths of the keys.
The third group of attacks tries to break a cryptographic system by gathering
additional information from an implementation of a cryptographic system.
Side-channel attacks can target different sources, such as power consumption,
electromagnetic radiation, acoustic information, or can gather information by
introducing faults to the implementation. In this dissertation, only side-channel
attacks based on power consumption variations are considered.
This section briefly introduces timing analysis (TA), simple power analysis
(SPA), and differential power analysis (DPA).
TA
A timing analysis tries to gather information by accurately measuring the
duration of specific computations. Its first occurrence was in 1996 [38], where
Kocher published timing attacks on various implementations.
2National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is an agency of the United States
Departement of Commerce
3Koblitz suggested to use a generalisation of elliptic curves for cryptography in [34]. This
is referred to as HyperElliptic Curve Cryptography (HECC).
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SPA
The simple power analysis attacks involve ‘visual’ inspection of power traces,
representing power usage of a device over time, and can be used to distinguish
large features. Examples of such features are: the number of rounds in AES [55]
and, at a high magnification, to distinguish a multiplication from a squaring
operation. Applying this latter example on an ECPM, leaks the scalar on a
double-and-add implementation of Algorithm 1, because the ECPA only occurs
for a scalar bit ‘1’. An implementation of Algorithm 2 results in a more time
constant implementation.
DPA
Differential power analysis attacks were introduced by Kocher et al. [39]. They
combine statistical analysis and error correction techniques to extract secret
information. DPA attacks consists of two stages: data collection and data
analysis. In the data collection stage a certain operation, executing a specific
task with specific parameters, is to be measured multiple times, while the data
analysis stage processes these measurements.
High-order differential power attacks (HO-DPA) are an advanced form of DPA
taking into account multiple data sources for the data collection phase. HO-DPA
was originally proposed by Messerges [47] and Chari et al. [9].
1.4 Summary of contributions
In most applications, cryptography is regarded as overhead with respect to the
main application. Hence, for the applications considered in this dissertation,
the area overhead is the most critical. Therefore, every implementation of
cryptographic components in this thesis is focused towards minimal area.
Keeping the required resources to a minimum, leaves the maximum amount of
resources for the main application, when both parts are implemented on a single
FPGA. A contribution is made in wrapping these cryptographic components in
a uniform wrapper to improve interconnectivity and interchangeability between
components.
If we want to contribute to having hardware follow the evolutions that software
has been through, a first required step is the secure and remote reconfiguration of
an FPGA deployed in the field. Our contribution in achieving this requirement
is the first implementation of a secure and remote reconfiguration of an FPGA.
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Moreover, we achieved to make this implementation as a single-chip solution
by implementing a cryptographic protocol in combination with bitstream
compression.
We also made a contribution in realising a licensing scheme for hardware IP
cores. To achieve this, we used a novel storage technique and an academic tool
to overcome the challenges in implementing a proof-of-concept implementation
of an existing and sound licensing scheme.
Our final contribution is in strengthening an existing distributed logging scheme,
by moving the storage of sensitive data from server to hardware. Without
precautions, this would result in a substantial communication overhead, during
which the sensitive data may be exposed. The reduction in communication
overhead and the avoidance of exposition is achieved by adding implementations
of cryptographic components on the FPGA, in order to perform the calculations
on the hardware.
When implementing applications that contain cryptographic components, a
number of different fields of research come together. The most important
research fields that meet in such an implementation are cryptology, hardware
design, system-on-chip, and design tools exploration. We tried to combine the
evolutions in these different fields of research into our implementations of the
applications.
In the remainder of this section, a summary of the published contributions that
resulted from this thesis is given. The publications are grouped per chapter of
this dissertation and contain a single line description that describes the actual
contribution.
Chapter 2
The design and discussion of the elliptic curve processor was presented at the 21st
IEEE International Conference on Application-specific Systems, Architectures
and Processors (ASAP), entitled: “A compact FPGA-based architecture for
elliptic curve cryptography over prime fields”, by Vliegen, Mentens, Genoe,
Braeken, Kubera, Touhafi, and Verbauwhede. This paper thoroughly describes
the processor, which we built from scratch. At the moment of publication, this
implementation was the smallest implementation of its kind, without having an
effect on the duration of its calculation. My contribution is the design and the
implementation of the architecture together with the writing of the paper.
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Chapter 3
A paper, focused on the hardware strengthening of the distributed logging
scheme, was published at the 15th Euromicro Conference on Digital System
Design (DSD) under the trivial title “Hardware strengthening a Distributed
Logging Scheme”, by Vliegen, Wouters, Grahn, and Pulls. The focus in this
publication was on the proof-of-concept of the hardware strengthening. My
contribution is the design and the implementation of the architecture of the
strengthening together with the writing of half the paper.
A more elaborated publication of the overall scheme and the hardware
strengthening is published as a Technical report of the Karlstad University, in
Sweden: “Distributed Privacy-Preserving Log Trails”, by Pulls, Wouters, Grahn,
and Vliegen. My contribution is a chapter in this report, that elaborates on the
hardware strengthening.
Chapter 4
The idea of remote reconfiguration of FPGAs is presented at the Dagstuhl
seminar ‘Dynamically Reconfigurable Architectures’ by Mentens, Vliegen,
Braeken, Touhafi, Verbauwhede, and Wouters, entitled: “Secure remote
reconfiguration of FPGAs”. This was an overview presentation that contains
results of my work.
The first implementation of this idea was presented at the 6th International
Workshop on Reconfigurable Communication-centric Systems-on-Chip (Re-
CoSoc), by Braeken, Genoe, Kubera, Mentens, Touhafi, Verbauwhede, Verbelen,
Vliegen, and Wouters. This work achieves remote FPGA reconfiguration by
sending full bitstreams to the FPGA. These bitstreams are stored in Flash
memory on the printed circuit board (PCB). My contribution is the design and
implementation of the communication core and writing of half the paper.
The introduction of partial reconfiguration in remote FPGA updates is accepted
for publication in the ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and
Systems, entitled: “Secure, remote, dynamic reconfiguration of FPGAs”, by
Vliegen, Mentens, and Verbauwhede. My contribution is the design and
implementation described in this article together with writing it.
A reinforcement on this work is to restrict the trusted zone to be only the
FPGA chip. A publication of this Single-chip solution was presented by Vliegen,
Mentens, Verbauwhede at the 2013 International Conference on Reconfigurable
Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig), under the title: “A Single-chip Solution for
the Secure Remote Configuration of FPGAs using Bitstream Compression”. My
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contribution is the design and implementation described in this paper together
with writing it.
Chapter 5
The results of the chapter that handles on the proof-of-concept implementation
of the licensing scheme is submitted to the Journal of Cryptographic Engineering.
This submitted article is entitled: “Practical Feasibility Evaluation and
Improvement of a Pay-per-Use Licensing Scheme for Hardware IP Cores in
FPGAs”, by Vliegen, Mentens, Koch, Schellekens, and Verbauwhede. My
contribution is the design and implementation of the static system, the
generation of the partial bitstreams, and the writing of the article.
Not discussed in this thesis
The first publication which is not discussed in this thesis, is: “Secure FPGA
technologies and techniques”, by Braeken, Kubera, Trouillez, Touhaffi, Vliegen
and Mentens. It was presented at the 19th International Conference on Field
Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL) and presents the results of a
literature study on the different types of FPGAs and their suitability to
cryptographic implementations. My contribution is limited to revision of the
paper.
An article in the ARPN Journal of Systems and Software, by Verbelen, Braeken,
Kubera, Mentens, Touhafi, and Vliegen, discusses the server architecture of a
system that controls and manages the remote updates of FPGAs in the field.
The title of the article is: “Implementation of a Server Architecture for Secure
Reconfiguration of Embedded Systems”. My contribution is focused on following-
up on the server architecture in order to make it suitable for communication
with the FPGA.
The elliptic curve processor, discussed in Chapter 2, has been altered to work on
binary Edwards curves. This implementation served as a testing-framework in
the work of Batina, Hogenboom, Mentens, Moelans, and Vliegen. The results of
this work were presented as “Side-channel evaluation of FPGA implementations
of binary Edwards curves”, at the 2010 International Conference on Electronics,
Circuits, and Systems (ICECS). My contribution is the design of the processor
together with the implementation of Edwards curves.
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1.5 Overview of the thesis
This dissertation consists of six chapters. This first chapter, Chapter 1, contains
an introduction that positions the research. Additionally it provides the reader
with the most relevant background information with respect to the remainder
of the thesis, and with a summary of my contributions. Chapter 2 describes the
implemented cryptographic components. These implementations are used in
the following three chapters which each describe a specific application. The first
application is presented in Chapter 3, which elaborates on the implementation
of a secure distributed logging concept. The second application describes
a single-chip solution for the secure and remote reconfiguration of deployed
FPGAs in Chapter 4. The final application is presented in Chapter 5 and is a
prototype implementation of a pay-per-use licensing scheme. The final chapter
in this dissertation, Chapter 6, draws conclusions of the carried out research
and summarises the different tracks on which future work could elaborate.
1.6 Conclusions
This introductory chapter first gives a motivating example to illustrate how
FPGAs can be used to assist in helping hardware follow the evolutions that
software has already gone through. Because of the importance of the FPGA in
our work, this chapter subsequently introduces the FPGA. Updating already
deployed devices requires security. This can be achieved by using cryptographic
algorithms and protocols. The relevant aspects of cryptology are introduced
in the subsequent section of this chapter. With a focus on applications, the
cryptographic overhead has to be as small as possible. This leads to a focus of
the implementations in this work on minimal resource usage. Finally, the main
contributions of this thesis are summarised and an overview of the dissertation
is given.
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Chapter 2
Cryptographic components on
FPGA
This chapter thoroughly discusses the four implemented cryptographic
components that realise basic cryptographic concepts explained in the Section 1.3.
These implementations are used in the applications handled in later chapters.
The first two components are unkeyed primitives: a cryptographic hash function
and a true random number generator. The third component is a public-key
primitive while the fourth implementation is a symmetric-key cipher.
These four components are wrapped into a similar interface, which is also
presented in this chapter.
2.1 The component wrapper
As mentioned above, every component in this chapter is wrapped into a
similar interface. This allows seamless interchangeability between different
implementations of a component. Thus, when a specific application requires
a component of which the implementation has a slightly different focus, this
interchangeability eases the substitution.
The component wrapper provides several inputs. Apart from a general ‘reset’
and ‘clock’ signal, an ‘enable’ signal is available in the interface to start the
component. Additionally, a variable number of inputs can be used to parametrise
the behaviour of the targeted component.
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Next to the inputs, a general ‘done’ output-signal indicates when a certain
component finished its operation.
To provide every cryptographic component with data input and output, a
memory interface is provided containing a 32-bit address, a 4-bit write-enable
(‘we’), a 32-bit data input (‘data_in’), and a 32-bit data output (‘data_out’).
The resulting wrapper is shown in Figure 2.1, where the dashed rectangle is
a place-holder for every cryptographic component. Every input and output,
discussed above, is shown in this figure. A right-pointing triangle represents an
input and a left-pointing triangle represents an output.
clock
reset
enable
input_n
data_in
data_out
done
32 32
m
256
we
control path
address
done_i
n
Figure 2.1: Architecture of the component wrapper
Every implementation discussed below fits in this wrapper, with exception of the
elliptic curve processor. The latter has the unified interface built-in. With this
common interconnect, every cryptographic component can easily be replaced by
another implementation. This may be desirable when better or more suitable
algorithms or implementations are required.
2.2 Hash / HMAC
A hash function naturally makes a good candidate for verifying data integrity.
If the data needs to be authenticated as well, a symmetric-key scenario is
appropriate. A cryptographic component that offers the former, with an
optional authentication on the data, incorporates both an unkeyed primitive
and a symmetric-key primitive into one component. Combining both primitives
saves reconfigurable resources.
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2.2.1 Secure Hashing Algorithm
There exist many algorithms to calculate a hash on a certain input. The first hash
function, standardised in 1993 by the American National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), was the Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA-0). Because it
contained an error in the specification that led to significant weaknesses, it was
replaced by the very similar SHA-1 in 1995. This algorithm produced a hash
value of 160 bits. In 2001, NIST has standardised a set of six cryptographic
hash functions under SHA-2 which all produce a hash of length: 224, 256,
384 or 512 [59]. In 2007, NIST announced a competition in search of new
hashing algorithms to find SHA-3, which was won by the Keccak algorithm [4]
in October 2012.
As a master thesis, Ramakers and Narinx implemented four candidates of
the latest hash competition: LANE, Luffa, Hamsi, and ECHO [53]. As a
reference they have implemented a SHA-2 function: SHA-256. The first
implemented cryptographic component in this dissertation starts from this
SHA-256 implementation.
The message is to be segmented to 512-bit blocks. The last block has to be
padded as described in the standard [59]. The first block is processed upon
receiving a ‘start’ signal, while other subsequent blocks are started with the
continue signal. When a block is parsed, the ‘done’ comes up to indicate the
256-bit hash is present at the output.
2.2.2 HMAC
In [56], the keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) is standardised of
which the algorithm was initially published in [40]. In the first pass, the key is
exored with a constant (IPAD) and precedes the message. On this, a hash is
calculated. In the second pass, the key is exored with another constant (OPAD)
and precedes the hash resulting from the first pass. On this new message, a
hash is again calculated. The result of the second pass is the HMAC on the
original message. This approach is visualised in Figure 2.2.
2.2.3 Implementation of SHA-256/HMAC
The implementation of SHA-256 is straightforward as the standard prescribes.
It takes a correctly padded input block of 512 bits and calculates or updates
the hash value. When the calculations are done, the ‘done’ signal comes up and
the hash is available at the output. Figure 2.3 shows the top level architecture
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HASH
block
hash
key IPAD message
key OPAD
HASH
block
hmac || = concatenation
Figure 2.2: Visualisation of the HMAC algorithm
of the SHA-256-implementation from [53]. The dashed rectangle fits the general
component wrapper, shown in Figure 2.1.
data_in
data_out
done_i
start
continue
256SHA-256512
control path
Figure 2.3: Architecture of SHA-256
The architecture of the HMAC implementation is shown in Figure 2.4. The
white rectangle in the middle holds the implementation shown in Figure 2.3.
The additional components are a 512-bit shift register, two 512-bit exor gates,
a single 512-bit multiplexer and a single 256-to-32-bit demultiplexer.
It is pointed out that during the calculation of the HMAC, the output of the
first pass has to be padded again and routed to the input to serve as input for
the second pass. This step is not implemented in hardware and has to be done
by the controlling component.
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Figure 2.4: Architecture of SHA-256/HMAC
The control path is implemented as a finite state machine (FSM)4 of which the
different states and their succession are shown in Figure A.2 in Appendix A.2.
2.2.4 Wrapper fitting of the SHA-256/HMAC
The dashed rectangle in Figure 2.4, is inserted in the dashed rectangle of the
component wrapper, shown in Figure 2.1. Table 2.1 summarises the signal
mappings.
Table 2.1: The SHA-256/HMAC signal mapping in the component wrapper
component wrapper
pin name pin name direction description
reset reset I active low reset
clock clock I main clock signal
start enable I new hash/HMAC calculation
continue input_0 I continue hash/HMAC calculation
last input_1 I last hash/HMAC calculation
hash_hmac input_2 I indicate hash or HMAC
data_in data_in I 32-bit input block
data_out data_out O 32-bit output block
we we O 4-bit write enable
address address O 32-bit write enable
done_i done O component done signal
4A finite state machine is a control structure that stores the state of a sequential process
at a given time,and can operate on inputs to change the status and/or cause an action or
output to take place for any given change.
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2.2.5 Implementation results
The results of the implementation of the SHA-256/HMAC component are shown
in Table 2.13 on page 52.
2.3 True Random Number Generator
The implementation of the true random number generator (TRNG) uses freely
running oscillator rings as physical random source. If a ring of an odd number of
inverters is implemented, the output starts switching between a logical ‘1’ and
‘0’. The speed with which the output switches, is implementation dependent.
This patented design was originally proposed by Schulz [67].
In [70], Sunar et al. build on this design to achieve an FPGA-based TRNG.
They implemented multiple rings which oscillate at a slightly different frequency.
Sunar et al. use this difference as the noise source for the random number
generator.
Wold and Tan improved the design of Sunar et al. in [77] by adding a flip-flop
after each oscillating ring. By doing so, the authors of [77] enhanced the
TRNG with better randomness characteristics and they have no need for post-
processing while their implementation still passes statistical tests. With these
improvements the design of Wold and Tan is more than a factor 10 smaller
in FPGA resources than the work of Sunar et al. Because all implemented
cryptographic components focus on area, the TRNG is implemented according
to the design in [77].
2.3.1 Implementation of TRNG
Figure 2.5 shows the architecture of the random number generator. The internal
grey-coloured boxes indicate possible repetitions which alter the size of the
oscillating rings, n_inv, and the number of oscillating rings, n_rings. The
large white-coloured box, which indicates the design of [77], produces a single
random bit on every clock cycle, which is shifted into a 256-bit register. Upon
the request for a random number, this register is sampled and presented at the
output. It is pointed out that two requests for a random number need to be
separated 256 clock cycles at least. This is to be managed at the controlling
level.
The implementation of the TRNG uses ‘generics’ to determine n_inv and
n_rings. The default values of these ‘generics’ are n_inv = 3 and
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n_rings = 50. The reason for choosing these defaults is a trade-off between
occupied resources of the implementation and the bias in the generated random
bits. Theoretically this bias should be 0.5 [77]. Using the lowest number of
inverters in a ring, as reported by Wold and Tan, reduces the occupied resources.
According to [77], the bias in 3 inverter oscillating rings approximates the
desirable 0.5 best when implementing 50 oscillating rings.
'0'
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D                                                     Q
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data_out
enable_RNG
done_RNG
control path
we
address
D                                                     Q
Figure 2.5: Architecture of the Random Number Generator
2.3.2 Wrapper fitting of the TRNG
The outer, dashed rectangle in Figure 2.5, is inserted in the dashed rectangle of
the component wrapper, shown in Figure 2.1. Table 2.2 summarises the signal
mappings.
2.3.3 Implementation results
The results of the implementation of the TRNG component, with 50 oscillating
rings built with 3 inverters, are shown in Table 2.13 on page 52. The reported
timing is for a single random bit.
The NIST statistical test suite has been run over approximately 1500 randomly
generated numbers. All the statistical tests on these random numbers passed
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Table 2.2: The TRNG signal mapping in the component wrapper
component wrapper
pin name pin name direction description
reset reset I active low reset
clock clock I main clock signal
enable_RNG enable I random number request
data_out data_out O 32-bit output block
we we O 4-bit write enable
address address O 32-bit write enable
done_RNG done O component done signal
except the non overlapping template test. This might indicate that a small
post-processing step is required.
2.4 Elliptic Curve Processor
The third cryptographic component is an elliptic curve processor (ECP) which
calculates the modular operations over a prime field GF (p). Although the
ECP architecture is scalable to every prime field curve, in the scope of this
dissertation it is only implemented for the P − 256 curve [60]. According to [21]
this field size is sufficient to provide long-term protection.
2.4.1 Implementation of the ECP
The implementation of the ECP follows the Harvard architecture, shown in
Figure 2.6, which implies having physically separated instruction and data buses,
in contrast to the von Neumann architecture. Next to these two memories there
is a control unit, an IO unit and an ALU.
The programs that run on the ECP are stored in the instruction memory as
hardware instructions, generally referred to as ‘microcode’. A small parser script
is implemented so the programs on the ECP can be written in machine code or
assembly and translated into microcode.
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control
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data
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IO
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Figure 2.6: Architecture of a Harvard processor
Data and instruction memory
The data memory is built out of nine serial 32-bit BRAMs to provide a maximum
data width of 288 bits. All these BRAMs are used as a dual ported RAM.
The instruction memory is a single BRAM configured as a ROM, which contains
the programs. The program counter provides the BRAM with an address and
the instruction memory returns the microcode instruction which is stored in the
instruction register. These instructions are 32 bits wide and represent fourteen
operations which are shown in Table 2.3, together with their operation code
(opcode), required number of arguments, a mnemonic, and duration to execute.
A microcode instruction has 3 reserved bits for future expansion, a 5-bit opcode
and 24 bits for operands.
Control unit
The control unit handles the instruction from the instruction memory according
to the classical fetch-decode-execute-increment approach. The program counter
indicates which instruction to fetch from the instruction memory and to store
it in the instruction register. The instruction gets decoded and directs the
operation of the necessary components through a finite state machine of which
the states and their successions are shown in Appendix A.1. The duration of
the execute step depends on which operation is requested. After this execution
the program counter is incremented with exception of the execution of a jump
or a restore of the program counter. Note that because of this implementation
approach, even a ‘NOP’ requires 5 clock cycles.
The control path of the ECP is an FSM of which the states and their successions
are shown in Appendix A.
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Table 2.3: Instructions handled by the ECP
assembly # duration
mnemonic opcode arg description [clock cycles]
storePC 00001 2 stores the program counter 5
jmp 00010 1 unconditional jump 4
cjmp 00011 2 conditional jump 5
0 jump if key(s_data-2 = $argv(2))
1 jump if counter 6=0
2 jump if counter(8) = 1
shift 00100 0 shift the scalar 5
exec 00101 5 execute arithmetic operation 1
restorePC 00110 1 restore program counter 4
cp2MEM 00111 2 copy data to local memory 14
cp2PT 01000 2 copy data to PT memory 15
load 01010 0 load scalar 6
loadN 01011 0 switch to GF (p) 7
loadO 01100 0 switch to GF (order) 6
NOP 11110 0 no operation 5
END 11111 0 end of program 4
1: depending on the operation
IO unit
To communicate with other components, the ECP has the common interface as
explained in the beginning of this chapter. The ECP has two custom instructions
to read and write to this external memory interface: cp2MEM and cp2PT,
respectively. These instructions read or write a complete 256-bit word to the
data memory in units of 32 bits.
ALU
Although no dedicated logical components are implemented, the arithmetic-
and-logic-unit (ALU) contains two arithmetic components: a modular
adder/subtractor (MAS) and a modular Montgomery multiplier (MM).
The architecture of the modular adder/subtractor is shown in Figure 2.7. The
component simply adds ‘X’ and ‘Y’ when ‘sign’ = ‘0’ and stores the result
in the data memory. Subsequently the modulus (N) is subtracted from the
sum. When the result of the subtraction is positive, the previously stored result
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is overwritten; otherwise the write enable signal (‘we_o’) is kept inactive to
feign overwriting. For subtraction, indicated with ‘sign’ = ‘0’, the procedure
is analogous with inverted signs. Negative numbers are represented using the
two’s complement method. To make a trade-off between area and speed, the
MAS works on a part of the operands thus reducing the width of the datapath
of the adder. The operands are segmented into words with a width of w bits.
The ECP is implemented with an 8-bit and a 32-bit word size w.
adder
Q     D
'0'
X
Y
Q     D
>>
b-1..0
we_i
N
'0' & .
out
we_o
D     Q
MSB
sign
 256+w bit w bit
Figure 2.7: Architecture of the modular adder/subtractor
Figure 2.8 shows the architecture of the implementation of the Montgomery
multiplier. This architectures multiplies ‘X’ and ‘Y’ modulo ‘N’ and presents
the result at ‘out’. To overcome the expensive division operation which should
be used in modular operations, Montgomery presented a novel technique for
calculating a modular multiplication in [49], which is shown in Equation (2.1).
ZMont = MM(XMont, YMont)
= XMont · YMont ·R−1 mod p.
(2.1)
By applying this technique, the division by the modulus is replaced
by a division by a power of two, which comes at a negligible cost in
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hardware. To use the Montgomery multiplication (MM), operands have to be
transformed into ‘Montgomery representation’, denoted XMont, by calculating:
XMont = x ∗Rmod p. It is pointed out that conversions to Montgomery
representation and back can be done through the Montgomery multiplication
itself: XMont = MM(x,R2) and x = MM(XMont, 1) respectively.
When calculating a modular multiplication using a Montgomery multiplication,
a final conditional subtraction is needed [49]. In [76], Walter presents a method
that avoids this final subtraction. The cost of this solution is that the width of
the intermediate values, in the Montgomery multiplication, increases with one
word. The consequence for the size of the data memory, is an increase of one
digit size w. Keeping in mind that the field elements are 256 bits, this results
in a data memory width of 256 + w bits, where w is the size of the datapath of
the mathematical components.
In [35], Koç et al. analyse and compare the time and space requirements of five
different implementations of a Montgomery multiplication. The ECP has an
implementation of the CIOS method because this method requires the least area
and the fewest number of additions and multiplications. The implementation of
the MM also is word-based, similar to the MAS. For details and formulas to
calculate R and N ′, [35] is referred to.
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adder
Figure 2.8: Architecture of the modular Montgomery multiplier
Finally, the top level architecture of the implementation of the ECP is shown
in Figure 2.9. The implementation has been described using generics to be able
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to change the datapath width of the MM and the MAS. As mentiond above,
the ECP is implemented with a 8-bit and a 32-bit word size w. To reduce the
required resources, both shift registers containing the operands of the MM and
MAS are shared. Also the modulus is stored in a shared shift register.
MAS
operand  >>
operand  >>
modulus >>    register
instruction
memory
control 
unit
 256+w bit 32 bit w bit
data
memory
data_out
done_i
we
address
data_in
IO
unitenable
MM
Figure 2.9: Architecture of the elliptic curve processor
2.4.2 Software on the ECP
The ECP can be used to calculate the point additions and point doublings as
explained in Section 1.3.3. With these two operations the calculation of a scalar
multiplication is feasible.
In certain settings, the scalar is a secret. For example, the generation of a public
key A in the elliptic curve public-key pair (A, a) is done through calculating P ·a.
Leaking the scalar during the scalar multiplication would leak the private key,
in this case. As explained in Section 1.3.4, SCA-attacks can be a way to find
such a secret. Coron described a simple SPA-attack in [12] which is applicable
if the scalar multiplication is implemented using the double-and-add algorithm
(Algorithm 1). The conditional if-branch is unbalanced in this algorithm. In
the case of scalar-bit ‘1’ the extra point addition is executed while it is not in
the other case. A visual analysis of the power consumption could reveal the
value of the used scalar-bit and thus leak the scalar.
Although not resulting in the value of the scalar, a TA (see Section 1.3.4) could
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be used to find the Hamming weight5 of the scalar which significantly reduces the
search space which could allow a brute-force attack. This vulnerability can easily
be overcome by using the Montgomery ladder (Algorithm 2 in Section 1.3.3)
which balances both branches of the conditional if-branch. Nevertheless, a good
focus on the assembly code is required. Table 2.4 gives a code snippet of the
assembly code that runs on the ECP. Although line 152 is functionally useless,
it compensates an unbalance in the assembly instructions for the execution of
the Montgomery ladder. Moreover, in the case of scalar bit value of ‘1’, the
code executes a ‘STOREPC’ and two ‘JMP’ instructions. Line 152 has to be
added to guarantee that the same instructions are executed in the case of a
scalar bit value of ‘0’.
Table 2.4: ECP assembly code snippet for the scalar multiplication
144 STOREPC 0 146
145 JMP 24 S ← 2 · · ·Q
146 CJMP 150 0 0 jump if scalar-bit ‘0’
147 STOREPC 0 149
148 JMP 51 Q← S +Q,S ← 2S
149 JMP 153
150 STOREPC 0 152
151 JMP 87 S ← S +Q,Q← 2Q
152 JMP 153
153 SHIFT
154 CJMP 146 1 jump if bitsremaining
155 RESTOREPC 1
In [31], Izu et al. present improved methods for implementing a scalar
multiplication which are resistant against SCA attacks. For the ‘Montgomery-
type method’ they increased the efficiency of the scalar multiplication by
encapsulating both formulas of the ECPA and ECPD into one formula.
Moreover, they use a projective coordinate system from which they only use the
x-coordinate and z-coordinate. This method performs an ECPA and ECPD
in 13 modular multiplications, 4 squarings, and 18 additions. To recover the
y-coordinate, possibly after multiple point operations, an additional 11 modular
multiplications, 2 squarings, and 7 additions are required. As a reference, a
comparison with the work of Cohen et al. [11] is shown in Table 2.5.
5The Hamming weight is defined as the number of non-zero symbols in a string. For a
binary value this comes down to the number of ‘1’ bits.
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Table 2.5: Comparison of operations between [11] and [31]
Cohen et al. [11] Izu et al. [31]
operation ECPA ECPD ECADDDBL Y coordinate
modular multiplication 26 11 17 13
addition 18 9 18 7
Because both Cohen et al. and Izu et al. use a projective coordinate system, an
additional bi-directional conversion is required. All required conversions thus
are:
• conversion to Montgomery representation: P (x, y)→ P (XM , YM );
• conversion to projective coordinates: P (XM , YM )→ Q(qx, qy, qz) where
qx = XM ∗ qz and qy = YM ∗ qz with qz = 1 ∗R which is the Montgomery
representation of the value ‘1’;
• conversion from projective coordinates: P (XM , YM ) ← Q(qx, qy, qz)
where XM = qxqz and YM =
qy
qz ∗ qz;
• conversion from Montgomery representation: P (x, y)← P (XM , YM ).
In the conversion from projective to affine coordinates, a division is used.
Because an implementation for a multiplication is present, this division is
calculated by multiplying with the inverse of the denominator. The calculation
of this inverse is done by using Fermat’s little theorem6, which substitutes the
calculation of the inverse with an involution.
To be able to run multiple programs on the ECP, the instruction memory
always starts by making a copy of a value from the pass-through memory to
the local memory. This copied value contains an address to which the processor
restores its program counter to in the second operation. After this boot-loader
mechanism, a reasonable amount of instruction memory is dedicated to general
functions which can be used by all programs. Finally, the remainder of the
memory is available for main programs. Three programs are implemented: the
calculation of an ECPM, the generation of a digital signature using the ECDSA,
and the verification of such a signature. This segmentation of the instruction
memory space is visualised in Figure 2.10.
6Fermat’s little theorem: If p is a prime number and a is an integer, then ap ≡ a mod p.
When a - p then ap−1 ≡ 1 mod p so ap−2 ≡ a−1 mod p.
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Figure 2.10: Segmentation of the instruction memory
2.4.3 Wrapper fitting of the ECP
The dashed rectangle in Figure 2.9, is inserted in the dashed rectangle of the
component wrapper, shown in Figure 2.1. Table 2.6 summarises the signal
mappings.
Table 2.6: The ECP signal mapping in the component wrapper
component wrapper
pin name pin name direction description
reset reset I active low reset
clock clock I main clock signal
enable enable I start ECP
data_in data_in I 32-bit input block
data_out data_out O 32-bit output block
we we O 4-bit write enable
address address O 32-bit write enable
done_i done O component done signal
2.4.4 Implementation results
The discussion of the results of the implementation of the ECP is twofold. First
a comparison with other published work is made. Hereafter, a more numerical
discussion together with possible improvements is given.
Related work
Most FPGA implementations of elliptic curve processors over prime fields are
optimised for speed, while the proposed implementation targets compactness,
for reasons explained in Section 1.4.
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The design of Örs et al. is based on a systolic array architecture for the modular
multiplier [61], while Sakiyama et al. use a course-grained matrix of modular
units to perform the modular multiplication [66]. These implementations do
not use any dedicated mathematical hard IP blocks, which make them suitable
for any FPGA or ASIC. The implementation of McIvor et al. [44] employs the
multiplier blocks on the FPGA.
One year after the publication [73] of the implementation made in this work,
Varchola et al. presented a solution to obtain a faster and more compact
solution [72]. They obtained this by: building an implementation that is
restricted to use primes in a special standardised form, by using a better model
for the internal adder, and by achieving an implementation at double the clock
frequency.
Table 2.7: Implementation comparison with literature
reference [44] [66] [61] [72] ECP
# slices 15 755 27 597 5 614 1 158 2 085
# MULTs 256 0 0 4 7
# BRAM 0 0 0 3 9
max. freq. (MHz) 39.5 40 91.31 210 68.17
ECPM latency (ms) 3.84 17.7 42.52 4.52 15.76
FPGA 1 2 3 1 1
year of publication 2004 2007 2002 2011 2010
italic: estimates
FPGA 1: Xilinx Virtex II Pro
FPGA 2: Xilinx Spartan-3 5000
FPGA 3: Xilinx Virtex-1000E
Table 2.7 shows a comparison to related work. The reported numbers for the
ECP are those used in its publication, which apply to a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro.
This device is no longer supported in the current design tools, but it provides
the most honest comparison. The only difference between the implementations
on both devices (Xilinx Virtex II Pro and Xilinx Virtex-5) is software handling
the Montgomery ladder. The older implementation uses the Montgomery ladder
with separate functions for ECPA and ECPD, as reported by Cohen [11], while
the other implementation uses the unified formula, as reported by Izu et al. [31].
The three oldest implementations report resources which do not include a
communication unit, whereas the two most recent implementations do. The
work of Örs et al. also provides support for 2048-bit RSA calculations. Although
not implemented here, a small update on the software of the ECP and the
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operand sizes provides this implementation with the same feature. This is not
possible with the more specialised work of Varchola et al., which outperforms
every other implementation with a smaller overhead. Both results of Varchola
and the presented ECP, target an implementation with a 32-bit datapath
(w = 32).
Numerical results
Table 2.8 summarises the clock cycle counts which are required to calculate a
certain operation. Because of the processor-architecture there is an overhead
of 4 cycles for the fetch, decode, execute and write-back steps (OHproc). The
‘execute’-step is used for both the calculation of a MM and a MAS. Because
these blocks have a different execution time, an enable-done approach is used.
Moreover, when the width of the datapath of a certain block changes, these
execution times also vary.
To find the actual duration of an ECPM, all clock cycles have to be added,
including those which are processor overhead. This sum has to be multiplied
with the period of the actual active clock. Table 2.9 shows the actual and
minimal duration of an ECPM, for different datapath sizes.
The FPGA resource requirements for an implementation on a Xilinx Virtex-
5 (XC5VFX70T) are summarised in Table 2.13 on page 52. These reported
resources reflect an implementation with unified formulas for an ECPA and
ECPD.
Possible optimisations
Because of time limitations, several possible optimisations are left unimple-
mented. Three important ones are explained here.
The FSM which directs the operations of the ECP, can be optimised. The
‘dummy’-state can possibly be eliminated, saving a single clock period on every
operation (with exception of restorePC and jump instructions). This would
reduce the overhead due to the processor architecture.
The software which runs on the ECP can be optimised by in-lining certain
functions. Every function call requires three overhead instructions: a store of the
program counter in the data memory, a jump to the function in the instruction
memory, and a restore of the program counter. On the most repeated functions,
this could result in significant gains in duration. To obtain this, the instruction
memory will grow due to the in-lining, but from Figure 2.10 can be seen there
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Table 2.8: Clock cycle count of ECP operations
operation s = (256 + w)/w
CCMAS 2× (s+ 2) +OHexec +OHproc
CCMM [2× (s+ 1) + 1]× s+ 2 +OHexec +OHproc
CCA→PM 1 6× CCMM + CCMAS + CCrestorepc
CCPM→A2 4× CCMM + CCrestorepc
CCY recovery 13× CCMM + 7× CCMAS + CCrestorepc
CCECPD 13× CCMM + 13× CCMAS + CCrestorepc
CCECPA& ECPD 17× CCMM + 18× CCMAS + CCrestorepc
CCMI 2× CCMAS + 256× (2× CCMM + CCshift)
+256× (2× CCcjmp + CCshift)
+CCload + CCrestorepc
CCMontgomeryLadder CCECPD + 255× (CCECPA& ECPD + CCshift)
+255× (2× CCcjmp + 2× CCjmp + CCstorepc)
+(CCjmp + CCstorepc) + CCrestorepc
CCECPM CCA→PM + CCMontgomeryLadder
+CCY recovery + CCMI + CCPM→A
+5× (CCstorepc + CCjmp)
+CCload + CCloadN
OHproc: Overhead due to processor = 4 cycles
OHexec: Overhead due to exec command = 2 cycles
1: Conversion from affine coordinates to Jacaobian & Montgomery
2: Conversion from Jacaobian & Montgomery to affine coordinates
CCrestorepc, CCshift, CCjmp, and CCloadN : according to Table 2.3
are a little over 700 memory locations still unused. Adding another BRAM to
the instruction memory, can double the number of available instructions, if this
might be required.
A better implementation for the two implemented ripple-carry adders in the MM
and MAS, could lower the area-cost and improve the maximum clock-frequency.
The current critical path runs through a ripple-carry adder.
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Table 2.9: Actual duration of a single ECPM
datapath width w [bit] 8 16 32
CCECPM 11 519 044 3 324 244 1 101 916
actual applied clock period [ns] 10.00 20.00
actual ECPM duration [ms] 115.20 22.04
minimum clock period [ns] 8.35 14.85
ECPM latency [ms] 96.19 16.37
2.5 Symmetric-key cipher
As mentioned in the cryptologic background (Section 1.3.2), there exist two
types of symmetric-key ciphers: stream ciphers and block ciphers. Table 2.10
shows a small comparison on the differences in both ciphers.
Table 2.10: Comparison between a stream and block cipher
feature stream cipher block cipher
scope of encryption character block of characters
buffering requirements low fair
error propagation low to none partial to successive1
padding not required required
data authentication none possible
freely available algorithms few2 many2
reusable no yes
1: all blocks after erroneous block
2: according to Menezes, Vanstone,
and Van Oorschot [45]
Mainly because the FPGA is not too constrained in resources and the number
of freely available algorithms, an implementation of a block cipher is made.
Naively using a symmetric block cipher could leak information on what is being
encrypted. This can be prevented by using a certain mode of operation. In [58],
NIST has published five modes to prevent information from leaking. The first
mode should be avoided because it could still leak patterns in the plain text.
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Hence, the four possible modes are:
• the cipher block chaining mode (CBC),
• the cipher feedback mode (CFB),
• the output feedback mode (OFB),
• the counter mode (CTR).
Table 2.11 compares these four modes of operation on several implementation
features.
Table 2.11: Comparison between four recommended modes of operation
feature CBC CFB OFB CTR
encryption only 7 3 3 3
error propagation 3 3 7 7
encryption parallelisable 7 7 7 3
decryption parallelisable 3 3 7 3
random access on decryption 7 7 7 3
hardware requirements XOR XOR XOR XOR + COUNTER
Because the CBC mode requires both an encryption and decryption component,
this mode does not fit into an area-critical implementation. Although the
duration of communication is not assumed critical, squandering time is not
acceptable either. Error propagation could render a complete conversation
senseless and would require to send the message again, thus wasting time. For
this reason CFB is avoided. Having the possibility to parallelise encryption
and/or decryption is a valuable feature but comes at an area cost, which is not
considered cheap in this work. Random access on decryption is not considered
to occur in this thesis so it is not a highly desirable feature. With these two
assumptions, the choice on the mode of operation is narrowed down to OFB
and CTR. With the focus on area, OFB is the more suitable mode of operation
for this work because the CTR mode needs the additional implementation of
the counter. It is pointed out that the CBC mode is often used to generate a
MAC, referred to as CBC-MAC [54]. Because data authentication can already
be provided by the HMAC implementation, the OFB-mode for only providing
data confidentiality is sufficient.
The OFB-mode of operation has to be built around the block cipher. The
architecture of this wrapper is shown in Figure 2.11. The dashed rectangle fits
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the general component wrapper, shown in Figure 2.1. The blue highlighted
rectangle is a place-holder for an implementation of a block cipher.
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Figure 2.11: Architecture of the OFB-mode of operation wrapper
2.5.1 Advanced Encryption Standard
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric-key block cipher
which is the current standard defined by NIST [55]. AES is based on the
Rijndael cipher [14], which was the winning submission to the AES selection
process. Three AES variants exist that all use a block size of 128 bits, but differ
in the length of the key. Depending on the length of key, a number of rounds
has to be iterated. A single round consists out of four functions: SubBytes,
ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey.
Three implementations of AES-128 were made: a small FPGA implementation
according to [10], a parallelised implementation of the standard, and a more
side-channel robust implementation, based on the work of Moradi et al. [52].
The input is to be segmented in 128-bit blocks. The first block is processed
upon receiving an ‘enable’ signal, while the ‘newenc’ signal is kept low. When a
block is parsed, the ‘done’ comes up to indicate the 128-bit output is present.
Other subsequent blocks are started upon receiving an ‘enable’ signal while the
‘newenc’ signal is kept low.
2.5.2 Implementations of AES-128
The first implementation is based on the work of Gaj et al. [10]. These authors
made efforts to have a small implementation on FPGA by moving certain usage
of reconfigurable resources to the usage of BRAM. The architecture of the
implementation is shown in Figure 2.12 and has a 32-bit datapath.
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Figure 2.12: Architecture of AES-128 implementation, according to [10]
Subsequently, the second implementation of AES-128 was realised in collabo-
ration with two Master students in the course of their master thesis [71]. The
datapath is 128 bits and focused to be able to run at 100 MHz clock frequency.
Figure 2.13 shows the implementation architecture of the second AES-128
implementation.
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SubBytes ShiftRows D                  Q
Figure 2.13: Architecture of second AES-128 implementation
Finally, the third implementation of AES-128 is as described in [52]. This
implementation is very small and has countermeasures against first order side-
channel attacks. The top level architecture is visualised in Figure 2.14.
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2.5.3 Wrapper fitting of the AES-128
The dashed rectangle in Figure 2.11, is inserted in the dashed rectangle of the
component wrapper, shown in Figure 2.1. Table 2.12 summarises the signal
mappings.
2.5.4 Implementation results
All three implementations, wrapped in the OFB wrapper as shown in Figure 2.11,
were implemented and successfully tested. The results of these implementations
are shown in Table 2.13 on page 52.
It is pointed out that ‘impl41’ could be further improved. As presented by
Hwang et al. in [28], the number of clock cycles for a 128-bit wide implementation
of AES can be reduced to 11 cycles. Because of the component wrapper, there
are 12 additional clock cycles required for reading the input and 8 additional
clock cycles for writing the result. This shows that an implementation that
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Table 2.12: The AES-128 signal mapping in the component wrapper
component wrapper
pin name pin name direction description
reset reset I active low reset
clock clock I main clock signal
enable enable I start AES-128
newenc input_0 I indicate new AES-128 block
enc_dec input_1 I indicate encryption or decryption
data_in data_in I 32-bit input block
data_out data_out O 32-bit output block
we we O 4-bit write enable
address address O 32-bit write enable
done done O component done signal
only takes 31 clock cycles should be feasible instead of the 63 clock cycles that
‘impl41’ uses.
2.6 Summary of the implementation results
Table 2.13 gives a summary of the implementations described in this chapter,
implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 (XC5VFX70T).
2.7 Conclusions
Four cryptographic components are presented in this chapter. Every
implementation foresees a similar interface so updating an implementation
with a more suitable algorithm or better performance is fairly easy. These
four components will be used in the following chapters where applications are
discussed, that build upon these implementations.
The elliptic curve processor was published in the proceedings of the 21st IEEE
International Conference on Application-specific Systems Architectures and
Processors (ASAP) [73].
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Table 2.13: Summary of the implementation results on XC5VFX70T
min clk num of
Occupied 36K DSP period clock latency
slices BRAM 48E [ns] cycles [ns]
impl10 671 0 0 9.06 94 852
impl20 316 0 0 3.36 9 31
impl30 1 116 10 7 14.85
impl31 1 016 10 2 8.35
impl40 358 10 0 50.36 610 30 720
impl41 1 121 4 0 7.09 63 447
impl42 1 029 0 0 4.46 330 1 472
XC5VLX20T 3 120 26 24
XC5VFX70T 11 200 148 128
XC5VLX330T 51 840 324 192
impl10: SHA-256, straightforward as in [59]
impl20: RNG, straightforward as in [77]
impl30: ECP_32_+RCA_*RCA
impl31: ECP_8_+RCA_*RCA
impl40: AES-128, as Gaj et al. [10]
impl41: AES-128, parallel
impl42: AES-128, as Moradi et al. [52]
Chapter 3
Application: Distributed
privacy-preserving log trails
This chapter describes the first application of this thesis: a proof-of-concept
implementation to strengthen a distributed privacy-preserving log trail scheme.
The existing scheme is designed by Pulls and Wouters and is employed as
described in [64]. In a first section the scheme is situated and briefly explained.
The second section describes our contribution: the implementation details of the
hardware strengthening. This strengthening is achieved by moving the memory
component, which contains the most sensitive data of the logging scheme, and
the cryptographic primitives from the log server to hardware. An additional
benefit from moving the cryptographic primitives is to avoid a communication
bottleneck. This chapter ends with a discussion of the results and a conclusion.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Situating the application [75]
In the contemporary online world, digital natives are well aware about their
privacy. They tend to be better at this than their parents, the digital immigrants,
who sometimes unconsciously share sensitive information to all of their ‘friends’,
if not the world. While this attitude protects digital natives from their peers
and other ordinary users of social networks, it does not protect them against the
entities that offer these online services to them. Even if these services are very
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well protected against attackers trying to harvest information about individuals,
a problem exists within the entities that operate these services. Companies
such as Facebook and Google are hosting a huge amount of valuable data that
can be used for profiling, directed marketing, and other purposes.
In today’s cloud services, processes are distributed by default. For individuals
it is interesting, and even a basic right [1], to see how their data is handled,
with whom it is shared, and how this constitutes a process across several
entities. This also makes them aware of potential privacy problems. For entities
that are handling these data, such openness can be a strong selling point.
Privacy-enhanced log services with log trail reconstruction, or ‘distributed
privacy-preserving log trails’ as Pulls and Wouters refer to it [64], can be a
solution to enable such feedback in a privacy-friendly way.
The entities and the dataflow of the scheme presented in [64] are shown in
Figure 3.1. The data to be logged are sent by the service provider itself to an
external log server, that will generate metadata that links log entries in two
chains: one for the affected user and one for the service provider. Afterwards,
the user can reconstruct his/her chain using the metadata added by the log
server. This is based on a public key pair between the user and the service
provider and a shared symmetric key between the service provider and the log
server. The privacy of the user is protected by cryptographically hiding that
a certain set of encrypted log entries refers to him/her. Once generated and
stored, log entries in the storage will only reveal information about their payload,
affected user, or the service provider that generated the entry to entities in
possession of both the correct secret key used to generate the metadata, and the
private key to decrypt the log entry content. Additionally, the scheme allows
for third party audits.
One rule of the scheme imposes that the log server will irretrievably overwrite
the current value of the shared secret key with its hash value, each time a
new log entry is added for the affected entity. Because of this, a compromised
or curious log server could − in theory − break some security and privacy
properties of the system by retaining state information that is supposed to be
deleted as part of the scheme. To reduce the minimum necessary level to which
the log server has to be trusted, the functionalities that deal with the state of
the log server should be moved to a trusted and certified hardware module. A
proof-of-concept implementation for such a hardware module is described in
this chapter.
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Figure 3.1: The entities and data flow in distributed privacy-preserving log
trails
3.1.2 Threat model
It is assumed that an attacker can store every message that is sent between the
user, the service provider and the log server, and that he/she also has physical
access to the log server. This allows him/her to run custom software on the
log server. On top of this, we also assume that the attacker has access to the
hardware described in this chapter and that he/she can perform basic power
analysis attacks.
3.1.3 A summary of the scheme
To be consistent with the published work [64], the service provider will be
referred to as the data processor Pα and the user as the data subject Sα. An
essential component in the scheme is the state component, shown in Figure 3.2.
The state component stores an identifier (IDEα), a data chain value (DCEα),
an identifier chain value (ICEα), and an authentication key (AKEα). Note that
E is a placeholder for either P or S. Every time a log server has to handle a new
action, the data subject state is updated using the incoming data. These results
are used together with the incoming data to update the data processor state
analogously. Subsequently, both results are used together with the incoming
data to update the log entry. Figure 3.3 shows the state component and its
update mechanism for a data subject state.
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Figure 3.2: The state and storage components in the log server
For every new process of data subject S1 that starts at a data processor P1, a
new key pair (PuKS1 , PrKS1) needs to be generated by S1. The public key,
PuKS1 , of the data subject S1 is transmitted to the data processor and serves
as the identifier for the process. Additionally, PuKS1 is used for the encryption
of the feedback from the log entries. It can happen that a process moves from
one data processor P1 to another P2. When this occurs, the identifier PuKS1
should be changed as well to ensure unlinkability over data processors and log
servers. Pulls and Wouters refer to this as cascading. They achieve this by
deriving a new public key PuK ′S1 from PuKS1 in such a way that it cannot be
linked to the original public key, PuKS1 . Moreover, deriving the corresponding
private key, PrK ′S1 , requires knowledge of the original private key, PrKS1 .
3.2 Implementation
To strengthen the distributed privacy-preserving log trail scheme, the state
component is to be moved from the log server to dedicated hardware. Thus, the
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Figure 3.3: The state component for a data subject and its update mechanism
amount of trust that needs to be put in the log server is reduced. Only moving
this memory component would not only undermine the strengthening but it
would also create a substantial overhead in communication between the log
server and the hardware component. To avoid this situation, the cryptographic
components, which work on the data in this memory component, are moved to
hardware was well. This resulting hardware implementation is referred to as the
trusted state component, which is used in a system-on-chip. This system-on-chip
will be used by the log server. The top level architecture of the trusted state
component is shown in Figure 3.4.
A MicroBlaze, which is a 32-bit softcore7 processor from Xilinx, lays at the
centre of the system-on-chip. This central processing unit (CPU) manages the
communication with the log server and directs the underlying cryptographic
primitives. The MicroBlaze uses a single dual-ported BRAM, which serves as
data and instruction memory, each with their own bus. The processor local
bus (PLB) is used to interconnect the trusted state component and Ethernet
peripherals to the MicroBlaze.
To communicate with the log server, there is a communication channel to the
MicroBlaze using the UDP/IP protocol over Ethernet. The reason for choosing
7A softcore is an IP core that is implemented on the reconfigurable resources of the FPGA.
The alternative is a hardcore IP block which is physically present on the die of the FPGA.
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Figure 3.4: The top level architecture of the trusted state component
UDP over TCP is twofold. The stack to handle the UDP protocol is much
smaller than the stack of TCP. This is because UDP offers less features than
TCP, for example in the TCP protocol every packet has to be acknowledged at
reception. Having to manage a smaller stack increases the number of packets
the MicroBlaze can handle. The second reason is that the packet header of
the UDP protocol is smaller than the header of the TCP protocol (8 bytes
and 20 bytes respectively). The application programming interface (API), as
described in [64], provides five methods:
• initialiseProcessorIdentifier - Initialises a data processor identifier in the
log server’s state.
• initialiseSubjectIdentifier - Initialises a data subject identifier in the log
server’s state.
• createEntry - Creates a log entry, which results in an update of the trusted
state.
• endEntityIdentifier - Removes the entry for the specified identifier in the
state.
• getStateIC - Allows the log server to read the content of the trusted state.
This feature is required to provide an auditable system.
A detailed look at the functional requirements of the API methods in [64],
learns there is a need for six cryptographic primitives: a public-key cipher,
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a digital signature component, a hash component, a MAC component, a random
number generator, and a symmetric-key cipher. Making an implementation
for this scheme comes with a need to make choices for these components. For
those components for which a NIST defined standard is available, a choice
was made to follow the current standards. Hence, the chosen algorithms are:
Digital Signature Algorithm, SHA-256, AES-128, and HMAC based on SHA-256.
A choice for the public-key cipher is made to use the Integrated Encryption
Scheme [68], the security of which is based on the Diffie-Hellman problem [18].
To be more precise, a variant of the Integrated Encryption Scheme for usage
with elliptic curves exists is used and is called ECIES. The requirements for
ECIES are a random number generator, a symmetric-key cipher, a key derivation
function, a MAC component and an elliptic curve processor.
Except for the key derivation function, an implementation for every component
is discussed in Chapter 2. The ECP in the trusted state component has a 32-bit
datapath and the AES-128 implementation is the small implementation, based
on the work of Gaj et al. [10]. The algorithm chosen as key derivation function
is KDF1, which is defined in ISO-18033-2 [30].
Implementations of these chosen algorithms are described in Chapter 2 with
exception of the trusted state memory component, that is described in
Section 3.2.1.
As is shown in Figure 3.4, these five components are interconnected through
a shared BRAM, for which the component wrapper has an interface, and are
coordinated by an FSM. The trusted state component is interfaced through
a command and status register, that can be written and read over the PLB
bus. The executed tasks upon receiving API method calls are visualised in
Figure 3.5. Grey coloured rectangles are functions that are executed on the
MicroBlaze. The coloured rectangles are cryptographic components, assisting
the MicroBlaze in the tasks to which they are attached.
3.2.1 Trusted state memory component
The trusted state memory component is implemented in BRAMs. This
implementation is done on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA (XC5VFX70T) which
provides BRAMs with a size of 36 Kibit. The maximum available width is
36 bits, which allows a depth of 1024 addresses. This 36-bit word holds four
parity bits, which reduces the actual amount of data to be stored to 32 bits per
address.
The width of the trusted state memory component is 1280 bits. This is composed
by two 256-bit coordinates for the point on the elliptic curve, which serves as
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Figure 3.5: Handling of the API methods by the MicroBlaze
a public key, and three times a vector with a width the size of the hash value.
Because the actual data width of a BRAM is 32 bits in total, the trusted state
memory component needs forty serial coupled BRAMs to be able to store a state
on a single address. The trusted state memory component stores and loads data
to/from the shared memory, as do the other cryptographic components and it
provides storage for 1024 log entries. Since, from a technical point of view, there
is no difference between an entry in the trusted state for a data subject or a data
processor, the memory space can be segmented to separate both types of entries
in the trusted state. The most significant bit of the address thus determines
its functions. An additional advantage of segmenting the memory space, is
that only a segment of the memory space has to be searched during the lookup
of a certain entry. A drawback however is that the ratio processor/subject
states is fixed and will have to be carefully predicted. Because this chapter
describes a proof-of-concept implementation, this ratio is hard to predict. For
this implementation the ratio is assumed to be 1.
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3.2.2 Software on the CPU
To initialise the MicroBlaze with custom source files, the toolflow depicted in
Figure 3.6 must be followed. The user’s source files are compiled into object files.
These get linked with a library that contains the drivers of the used (Xilinx)
IP cores, and with a linker script. Both the library and the linker script are
generated by the Xilinx Software Development Kit, which is part of the Xilinx
ISE Design suite. The result of the linker step is an executable that runs on
the MicroBlaze.
This executable is to be stored as the initialisation of instruction and data
memory in the bitstream. This is done with the ‘data2mem’ program from
the Xilinx ISE Design suite and requires an additional BRAM memory map
file (.bmm extension). This bmm file describes how individual block RAMs
constitute a contiguous logical memory space and it contains which BRAM
in the FPGA is used for the instruction and data memory. The ‘data2mem’
program results in a bitstream for which the MicroBlaze has an initialised
instruction and data memory.
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mb-gcc
compiler
object
files
linker 
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Figure 3.6: Toolflow to initialise the instruction/data memory of the MicroBlaze
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the MicroBlaze communicates
with the log server using an Ethernet connection with the UDP/IP protocol. The
software running on the MicroBlaze is written in C and starts by initialising the
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Ethernet softcore, which is a Xilinx IP core. Secondly, the constant parameters
are initialised, which are mainly used for program offsets, network settings,
padding messages for the HASH/HMAC component and the keys used in the
scheme. After the initialisations, the MicroBlaze keeps polling the Ethernet
component for incoming instructions, following a flowchart as depicted in
Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Flowchart of the software running on the MicroBlaze
The flowchart first handles requests using the address resolution protocol to find
the Media Access Control (MAC) address of the network interface card with a
certain IP address. When an IPv4 packet, destined for the MicroBlaze, arrives;
the requested API method is looked for in the first payload byte. Depending on
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this command, one of the threads in Figure 3.7 is followed. After completing
the requested API method, the MicroBlaze starts waiting for a new request
again.
3.2.3 Implementation results
Area
The number of used resources for a trusted state component are shown in
Table 3.1. The trusted state component is built with ‘impl10’, ‘impl20’, ‘impl30’
and ‘impl40’ from Table 2.13 at page 52. The complete system uses 4800 slices
and 71 BRAMs, while the trusted state component itself takes 2956 slices and
61 BRAMs.
Table 3.1: Occupied resources in a Virtex-5 FX70T
# slices # BRAM
trusted state component 2 956 61
complete system 4 800 71
available 11 200 148
As could be expected, the BRAMs are the most critical resource. It is clear
from Table 3.1 that a second trusted state component could be implemented in
the same FPGA. Even with a second component, there is a little less than half
of the number of slices of the FPGA available. This illustrates there is still area
available to speed-up the hardware implementation with larger components or
to parallelise components. Another option could be to use distributed memory.
Timing
The time it takes to execute one API command can be calculated by counting
clock cycles. The system-on-chip works on a 100 MHz clock frequency, which
corresponds to a period of 10 ns per clock cycle. The counting of clock cycles
starts when the command has arrived at the MicroBlaze and stops after the
response message is generated. This way, only the duration of the actual
calculations is timed. The additional communication cost in timing has to be
added to obtain the entire duration. It is pointed out that the trusted state
component operates at 20 MHz to meet the timing constraints of ‘impl40’ and
‘impl30’. This is further elaborated in Section 3.3.2.
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Table 3.2: Timing results of the hardware implementation and software reference
of the five API methods
Hardware Software
Target at 0 Target at 511
small big small big
scalar scalar scalar scalar
[ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
initialiseProcessorIdentifier 68.47 167.10 79.66 178.29 59
initialiseSubjectIdentifier 68.72 167.35 91.10 189.73 60
createEntry 1.07 23.45 0.062
endEntityIdentifier 9.71 20.90 0.020
getStateIC 0.37 22.75 41
clock frequency 20 MHz 2.2 GHz
Table 3.2 gives multiple results for the duration of a single command on the
hardware. The reason for these multiple timings is twofold. The first reason
is due to a side effect in the elliptic curve processor. When the ECP performs
a scalar point multiplication, the scalar has to be scanned bitwise, starting
from the most significant ‘1’, skipping all leading ‘0’ bits. As a result the total
execution time of a point multiplication depends on the scalar.
When encoding a message with ECIES, two such scalar point multiplications
(with the same scalar) are calculated. This common scalar is a random number.
Hence, it cannot be predicted exactly how much time a certain instruction takes.
Two extreme cases are when the scalar is 0x1 (small scalar) and when the most
significant bit of the scalar is ‘1’ (big scalar).
A second reason for the multiple results for the duration of a single command is
the location of a trusted state in the trusted state memory. When a new state
(both for data processor and data subject) is to be initialised (or to be searched
for) the MicroBlaze has to check the identifiers. To check these identifiers, a
linear search in the trusted state memory is performed. This again gives a
minimum and maximum delay, depending on the location of the target in the
memory space.
Table 3.2 also gives the duration of the different methods with a software-
only version of the distributed privacy-preserving logging scheme, which was
developed at Karlstad University. The software implementation is written in
Java and runs on an AMD Turion X2 Ultra Dual-Core Mobile ZM-82 2.2 GHz
processor. From this table it is clear that the hardware implementation slows
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down the logging system. The differences in the initialisation of the trusted state
are minimal. This is because the hardware executes the elliptic curve operations
much faster than the software version. On the other hand, the difference in
duration of the ‘EndEntityIdentifier’ method is considerably larger. Since this
method will not be used as often as others, it is not considered as a big issue.
The getStateIC method might be the second most (or in some settings even
the most) called method. Hence, a faster execution of the getStateIC method
on hardware, is an additional gain of the hardware strengthening. The biggest
issue, on the other hand, is with the createEntry method.
By comparing the timing results from Table 3.2 with Figure 3.5, it can be
concluded that, when only the symmetric cipher, the hash function and the
MAC function are called by a method, the hardware performs not as good as
software. When the elliptic curve operations are required in a method, the
hardware implementation’s delay is comparable. The reason for this is that the
calculations of ECP are faster on hardware than on software. The loss in time
of the symmetric-key cipher, the hash, and the MAC is compensated by the
gain in time of the ECP.
Table 3.2 also gives the clock frequency on which the hardware and software
are operating. Shifting the focus of the implementations more to speed, can
contribute to narrowing the performance gap between the hardware and software
versions. Table 3.1 indicates there are resources available to achieve this.
3.3 Results
With the implementation, as described in Section 3.2, we achieve both goals
of moving the location of the state memory from the log server to hardware,
together with the implementations of the cryptographic coprocessors. The result
is the trusted state component.
3.3.1 Additional threats
This section discusses newly added threats and their impact on the overall
system. The main additional threats are:
1. Denial of service attacks by interfering with the interconnect.
2. Timing attacks to locate an entity in the memory.
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3. Possible loss of the complete internal state because the Block RAMs in
the FPGA are volatile.
4. Storage of key material in the bitstream.
Solving the first additional threat is a difficult problem, for which no immediate
solution exists. A malicious user, who wants to tamper with the log server
by interfering with the interconnect, obviously could interfere with other
components in the log server. Therefore it is quite futile to protect against such
a threat without physically restricting physical access to the log server and the
attached hardware.
The second introduced threat is a TA. Whenever a data processor (or data
subject) is registered to a log server, a new trusted state is entered in the
trusted state memory component. This means that these entities are stored
in a chronological order. A honest-but-curious log server could time how long
it takes to lookup an entity in the trusted state to determine for which entity
another event is logged. This is a direct threat to the anonymity of the entity
in the case of data subject. To solve this threat, a periodical shuﬄe could
be introduced which runs independently from the log server and switches the
locations of some values in the trusted state component. By doing so, the
honest-but-curious log server can never be sure whether or not a certain entity
still is at a certain address in the memory and therefore the timing attack is
rendered useless.
The third threat comes from the volatility of the BRAM, which leads to a
complete data loss whenever there is a power failure. A solution is to copy the
states to an external, non-volatile memory (NVM) e.g. Flash memory. Since
it is not acceptable for other people (or their servers) to read these data, they
should be encrypted using a public-key cipher for which the trusted party owns
the private key. This encryption could be directed by the MicroBlaze, using
the cryptographic components of the trusted state. To write the trusted state
memory to an external memory, the device still needs a power supply. Different
possibilities are at hand. One is to depend on the fact that most servers with
important jobs are connected through an uninterruptible power supply. As soon
as the log server receives a signal that a power failure occurred, it should send
an extra command to the FPGA, indicating not to accept any more changes
and to store the states on NVM. Another solution is to provide the required
energy through a dedicated component (e.g. a battery or a supercap). As soon
as the custom circuit detects a power failure, the energy storage will provide
power. Thus, the FPGA can encrypt and write the content of the trusted state
memory to NVM.
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The storage of the key material in the bitstream is a fourth threat. This manifests
itself in the use of ECIES and in the potential backup mechanism. The ECIES
algorithm requires the presence of two vectors (S1 and S2) which are saved as
constants in the instruction memory of the controlling CPU. Eavesdropping the
configuration channel could reveal the values of these two vectors which would
break the public-key encryption. The key of the potential backup mechanism,
would also be exposed to this same threat. A solution for the latter might be
obtained from Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [23]. An implementation
of a PUF and a KDF can be used to obtain the key for the backup mechanism,
thus avoiding the need for storing this key in the bitstream.
3.3.2 Performance bottlenecks and improvements
Although a working proof-of-concept implementation is achieved, the perfor-
mance can be further improved. This led to a profiling of the implementation
to find the bottlenecks. The most important issues are:
1. the presence of a DCM in the trusted state peripheral
2. the unnecessary excessive use of trusted state entity lookups
3. the unnecessary excessive use of memory copies in the shared memory
4. the use of Ethernet
The first bottleneck is due to the presence of a digital clock manager (DCM).
This DCM was required to meet the timing constraints of the AES and the
ECP implementations, ‘impl40’ and ‘impl30’ from Table 2.13 respectively. The
available clock signal has a frequency of 100 MHz, which has to be scaled down
to 20 MHz to meet all the timing constraints. The clock signal that goes to the
trusted state component is hence five times slower than its controlling entity.
Additionally, clock cycles are lost for the synchronisation of the command
and status registers between both clock domains. If only the ECP and AES
implementations were to be moved to a slower clock domain, the area overhead
for the synchronisation between the two clock domains would be substantial,
due to the synchronisation of all their connections to the shared memory. To
prevent this, a choice was made to move the complete trusted state component
to the slower clock domain. This way only the status and command register
need to be synchronised. This bottleneck can be overcome by using faster
implementations for the ECP and AES. Using ‘impl31’ and ‘impl41’ in the
trusted state component would allow a clock frequency of 100 MHz and avoids
the use of the DCM and its additional overhead.
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The second bottleneck is encountered when a lookup happens in the trusted
state memory component. The covered search space is scanned linearly, getting
the entities’ states one by one. Subsequently, a comparison is made between the
512-bit identifiers which are to be searched for and the 1280-bit states which
are fetched from the trusted state memory component. This bottleneck can be
solved by restricting the copied data to the identifier only. Nevertheless, this
would still be a bottleneck. It would be more economical to copy the searched
identifier to the trusted state and perform the lookup in there. The results on
area indicate there is still room to overcome this bottleneck with this solution.
The third bottleneck is similar to the second bottleneck. A lot of data in
the shared memory has to copied around to maintain a certain memory map.
However, this is not required and could be bypassed. Analogously to the second
solution to prevent the second bottleneck, the necessary copies of data in the
trusted memory state can be moved to hardware on the trusted state itself.
Another bottleneck might be found in the choice of using Ethernet. On one
hand, using a faster communication channel, such as the PCI bus, can reduce
the additional delay due to the communication. On the other hand, connecting
the trusted hardware through Ethernet allows the sharing of a single hardware
module between several log servers.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter describes a proof-a-concept implementation to strengthen a
distributed privacy-preserving log trail scheme. The implementation is realised
through the implementation of four cryptographic primitives, together with a
dedicated memory core. The strengthening of the logging concept has been
proven feasible and solutions for improving the performance have been identified.
Additional threats, introduced by the hardware strengthening, and a brief study
on the possible improvements are discussed.
This work has been published in the proceedings of the 15th Euromicro
Conference on Digital System Design (DSD) [75]. It also has been published as a
chapter in the technical report ‘Distributed Privacy-Preserving Log Trails’ [64],
and led to the master thesis of Ünal and Sallaerts.
Chapter 4
Application: Towards a
single-chip, secure, remote
FPGA reconfiguration
This chapter describes the second application of this dissertation: a single-chip,
secure and remote FPGA reconfiguration. First an introduction presents the
application and handles the threat model. In the next section the implementation
details are given. Finally, this chapter ends with a discussion of the results and
a conclusion.
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Situating the application
Bringing electronic devices to the market is an expensive venture. Producing
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) for these devices is time
consuming, which also reflects in the price of the device. This makes designing
an ASIC for small volume electronic devices unattractive. Two important
differences between FPGAs and custom silicon devices are reconfigurability and
price. Although the unit price for an FPGA is higher, this drawback can be
compensated by using the reconfigurable nature of the FPGA. Features like
remote issue-solving and upgradeability are feasible on FPGAs, which could
prolong the life-span of an electronic device as is shown in Figure 4.1. FPGA
69
70 APPLICATION: TOWARDS A SINGLE-CHIP, SECURE, REMOTE FPGA RECONFIGURATION
configuration updates can be made with physical access to the device, but in
the case of electronic devices deployed in the field, it is more efficient to perform
updates remotely over a broadband Internet connection. However, remote
communication introduces security risks such as the sabotage of a working
system or the unauthorised confiscation of IP. Solutions have been presented by
FPGA vendors, but they seem insufficient. There is, for example, the attack by
Moradi et al. [51], that breaks the encrypted full FPGA configuration using the
built-in decryption core. Another example is that the FPGA configuration could
not be altered from within the FPGA by means of an encrypted bitstream.
ASIC
FPGA
in-field
reconfigurable
FPGA
time
concept                            production                             end of life
revised implementation
reconfiguration
> 3 month
Figure 4.1: The prolonged lifetime of an FPGA driven electronic device
This chapter describes two solutions for the secure, remote reconfiguration of
FPGAs which reside in an electronic device with a connection to the Internet.
The difference between both solutions lies in the amount of trust that can be
put in the electronic device and is explained further in the next section. The
security architectures of the solutions do not rely on a Trusted Third Party
(TTP) and there is no need for the central configuration instance to keep a list
of secret keys for each device in the field. To achieve these features, the FPGA
system is based on dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR). The difference with
regular partial reconfiguration is that the static system can continue working,
albeit without the use of the functionality which is updated.
In summary, the contributions of this work are the use of entity authentication in
the communication, the introduction of remote dynamic partial reconfiguration
to obtain an overall online and active partition, and achieving a single-chip
solution for remote FPGA reconfiguration.
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4.1.2 Threat model
As mentioned above, two different solutions are presented which differ in the
amount of trust that can be placed in the device. In the first solution the printed
circuit board is considered as trusted, while in the second solution only the
FPGA is trusted. The chapter refers to these with Board-is-Trusted (BisT) and
FPGA-is-Trusted (FisT), respectively. For both the BisT and FisT solution, the
threat model contains four entities, which are shown in Figure 4.2. Attackers
can target the communication channel and the device.
FPGA
Central
Reconfiguration
Server
@ distributor's
The device
Passive
attacker
  the 
communication
        channel
Active
attacker Intrusive attacker
Non-intrusive attacker
Figure 4.2: The entities in the threat model
The channel
To achieve remote reconfiguration of FPGAs in electronic devices in the field,
communication will take place between two entities: the central reconfiguration
server and the device that contains the FPGA. The central reconfiguration
server is maintained by the distributor of the electronic device and requires a
communication channel to the device. It is assumed both passive and active
attackers have access to this channel.
A passive attacker can only monitor the channel. Without precautions,
eavesdropping the channel can result in IP theft. Passive attackers are assumed
to have an inexhaustible supply of storage to store communication sessions,
which allows the attacker to compare intercepted messages with every message
ever sent. Finding patterns in communications could leak information.
An active attacker cannot only monitor the channel, but can also alter or
introduce the information that is transferred over the channel. Being able to
alter the channel could lead to spoofing attacks or man-in-the-middle attacks.
In the former case, active attackers can alter the content of a message, that is
sent by an entity. In the latter, the attacker impersonates both entities, while
these entities believe they are communicating with each other. Both attacks
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pose a threat to the participating entities. Without precautions, unauthorised
bitstream transfers can result in the malfunctioning of the device.
The device
The device containing the FPGA can be threatened by non-intrusive and by
intrusive attackers, who both have physical access to the device. The former
monitor pins, circuits, or power consumption as side-channels in search of leaking
information. The latter try to impede the correct behaviour by manipulating
the device. This can be done by re-routing wires, altering the supply voltage,
by breaking the housing of the FPGA and interfering with the silicon, or by
other destructive attacks.
For the BisT solution, only the threat of non-intrusive attackers, performing side-
channel analysis attacks based on the observation of power traces, is taken into
consideration. In the FisT solution an intrusive attacker who can manipulate
wiring on the printed circuit board, is also considered.
4.1.3 A summary of the solutions
In the majority of the DPR designs, the static partition covers the largest part
of the FPGA, while the reconfigurable partitions are kept small. In contrast
to this general approach, the presented solutions place the main functionality
of the FPGA in a single reconfigurable partition. The static partition of the
FPGA contains the overhead that is required for allowing secure and remote
communication and for reconfiguration. For this reason it is important to keep
the static partition as small as possible, leaving as much of the reconfigurable
area available for the main application.
The single reconfigurable partition can be reconfigured with a partial bitstream,
that is to be generated at the central reconfiguration server. This latter
entity sends the partial bitstream containing the updated behaviour to the
FPGA over the Internet. In order to make the proposed solutions address
the threat to communications, a secure communication protocol is necessary.
The required protocol should provide three cryptographic principals, as defined
in Section 1.3.1: data confidentiality, data authentication, and mutual entity
authentication. With such a protocol a cryptographic key can be established
that can be used to encrypt and authenticate the new bitstream.
When the bitstream securely arrives at the FPGA, the data integrity should
be verified before reconfiguring the reconfigurable partition. An additional
challenge is the storage of the partial bitstream. In the BisT solution external
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memory is used to store the incoming bitstream, but for the FisT solution the
bitstream should not leave the FPGA chip. Data compression should be used
to implement the FisT solution.
An additional benefit of the proposed solutions is the reduced downtime of
the main applications. Because the partial bitstream is already near or at the
FPGA, the communication time is strongly reduced.
4.2 Implementation
4.2.1 Related work
This section summarises related work that has been done on reconfiguration of
FPGAs, together with a summary of the work done on data compression with
respect to bitstreams.
Work on secure FPGA reconfiguration
The work of Castillo et al. [8] describes a system for a remote self-reconfiguring
FPGA. They offer data confidentiality and data authentication. The former
is guaranteed by encrypting the bitstream with the DES algorithm, while the
latter is done with a MD5 hash. It is also mentioned that the data source
should be authenticated using public-key based cryptography, but this was
not implemented. In contrast, both the BisT and FisT solutions use stronger
algorithms and provide an implementation for the public-key approach.
Gonzalez et al. make a comparison between two softcore processors: the
MicroBlaze and the LEON2 [24], which are used in a self-reconfigurable system
in which an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm can be changed. Our
work focuses on general FPGA reconfiguration rather than on IP cores. In
both the BisT and FisT solutions the reconfigurable partition is a standalone
implementation, which has no functional connections to the static partition.
In [20], Drimer and Kuhn present a protocol for secure, remote updates of FPGA
configurations. Their work provides data confidentiality, data authentication
and freshness of bitstreams. They use a new protocol, in contrast to the protocol
used in our solution which has been around for more than twenty-five years
and is still not broken. In their work, newly communicated bitstreams are
stored in non-volatile memory, either already decrypted or still encrypted. The
former is to be used on low-end devices (that do not provide decryption during
configuration), which allows attackers to eavesdrop the decrypted bitstream.
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The latter is to be used on high-end devices (that provide decryption during
configuration), which allows attackers to eavesdrop the encrypted bitstream by
using advanced techniques as presented by Moradi et al. in [51]. In the BisT
solution the bitstream never leaves the FPGA in plain text, while in the FisT
solution the bitstream never leaves the FPGA at all. Moreover, the incoming
bitstream reconfigures the FPGA through the Internal Configuration Access
Port (ICAP) thus avoiding the vulnerability, exploited by Moradi et al. [51].
SeReCon, by Kepa et al. [32], is a secure reconfiguration controller for self-
reconfigurable systems. The work focuses on updating and interchanging IP
cores. Even IP cores from third parties can be accepted if their fitter component
detects no issues. However, with SeReCon the reconfigurable parts of the
FPGA are reduced to IP cores which fit into the design. The overhead of their
system is also rather substantial: the SeReCon component uses two MicroBlaze
softcores with accompanying buses. The transfer of the IP core bitstreams is not
described, but the only communication components available in their system
are a JTAG port and a serial port, which both require the physical presence of
a technician to update IP cores.
In [16], a secure protocol and its implementation, for remote bitstream updates
is presented by Devic et al.. They focus on preventing replay attacks. To achieve
this, they introduce the use of tags on bitstreams, which are counters on the
succession of the bitstreams. In more recent work, Devic et al. present the use
of a secure protocol ‘SecURe DPR’ to prevent bitstream spoofing and replay
attacks for dynamic partial reconfiguration [17]. Their threat model does not
consider side-channel analysis attacks, as introduced in [38, 39]. Both in the
BisT and FisT solutions, spoofing attacks and replay attacks are countered,
while measures for power-oriented side-channel analysis resistance are also taken
up to a certain level.
Table 4.4 on page 99 summarises a comparison between our work and
other published, related work. Only related work which targets a broader
reconfiguration than IP cores, is taken up in this comparison.
Work on bitstream data compression
In [27], Pan et al. present a new technique: Difference Vector compression, which
gains data compression by sending only the differences between a configuration
frame and a beneficiary frame. They extend this technique by reading back
frames from the current configuration, which are used as a reference to build
the Difference Vector.
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Koch et al., in [36], use three techniques: run-length encoding (RLE), Lempel-
Ziv algorithms and Huffman compression. They compared these techniques on
a set of benchmark bitstreams both on compression ratio and resource cost of
the decompresser.
Haiyun and Shurong have implemented in [26] the Lempel–Ziv–Welch (LZW)
algorithm [15]. Their work achieves a compression ratio of 43.69% for partial
bitstreams.
The work of Ştefan and Coţofanaˇ [13] focuses on bitstreams for Xilinx Virtex-4
devices. They use several techniques and combinations of techniques to
achieve bitstream compression and they discuss the accompanying hardware
implementations to perform the decompression. They draw two main
conclusions: 1) the internal organisation of bitstreams is likely to change
between FPGA families and 2) synthesis tools produce bitstreams with the
ratio of ‘0’ and ‘1’ symbols as the main source of redundancy. The latter turns
the focus on the simpler compression methods.
A combination of run-length encoding and bitmask-based compression is used
in the work of Qin et al. [65]. They outperform other compression techniques,
while maintaining high speed decompression.
4.2.2 Cryptographic protocol and algorithms
The first step in the communication consists of the two entities agreeing on a
secret, only known to those two entities, by using a cryptographic protocol. This
secret, or cryptographic key, will enable the secure transmission of the (partial)
bitstream in the communication later on. The protocol family candidates for
agreeing on a shared secret, are hierarchically summarised in Figure 4.3.
To choose an appropriate protocol, the hierarchy of Figure 4.3 needs to be
descended.
Long-term or session key
Figure 4.3 illustrates that there are two possible keys that can be agreed upon:
a long-term key and a session key. As explained in [45], the use of a session key
can be motivated by the following arguments:
• to limit the amount of available cipher texts (under a fixed key) for
cryptanalytic attacks;
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cryptographic protocol
based on a long-term key based on a session key
key establishment
by
key agreement protocol
key establishment 
by
key transfer protocol
KAP, using
symmetric-key cryptography
KAP, using
public-key cryptography
using a TTP without TTP using a TTP without TTP
e.g. STS e.g. full STS
Figure 4.3: The cryptographic protocol family candidates, where KAP is a key
agreement protocol and TTP is a trusted third party. The dark grey boxes
indicate the choices which were made.
• to limit the exposure, with respect to both time period and quantity of
data, in the event of a (session) key compromise;
• to avoid the long-term storage of a large number of distinct secret keys (in
the case where one entity communicates with a large number of entities),
by creating keys only when actually required;
• to create independence across communication sessions or applications.
Key establishment by a key agreement or key transfer protocol
In this application the session key is to be agreed on, every time a communication
session is initiated. To be more precise, a key establishment protocol runs
between the central reconfiguration server and the device in the field containing
the FPGA, prior to every communication session. Key establishment protocols
can roughly be divided into key transport protocols and key agreement protocols.
In case of the former, there is one entity that determines the secret and securely
transfers it to the other entity. In the latter type, the shared secret is generated
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by both entities so no single entity can predetermine the resulting secret. The
freshness of the session key is guaranteed by the fact that every entity actively
contributes to generate the session key.
Key agreement through symmetric-key or public-key cryptography
There are mainly two techniques to implement a key agreement protocol. One is
based on symmetric-key cryptography and the other one is based on public-key
cryptography. In this work a public-key protocol is used. The reason for doing
so is key management. Using symmetric-key cryptography, a key has to be
stored centrally for every device that leaves the factory floor. Whereas using
public-key cryptography, the use of public keys and certificates for those keys,
makes the central storage of a list of private keys unnecessary. Such a list
would be an attractive target for attackers because they could gain access to
every device in the field, by only attacking a single point. Another reason for
choosing public-key cryptography is the possibility to expand towards a public-
key infrastructure, which would allow multiple and distributed reconfiguration
servers. Note that the choice for a public-key based protocol for key agreement
does not mean public-key cryptography is used for the encryption/decryption
of the reconfiguration data.
Public-key cryptography with or without trusted third party
Further, some public-key protocols make use of a trusted third party (TTP),
while others do not. The TTP is often also referred to as the certification
authority or the authentication server. The TTP could act in the role of
a registration authority, a key generator, a key server, and other roles or
combinations of roles. In the presented setting, each electronic device originates
from a site that is trusted by the distributor. Here, the certificate CertB , which
is explained later, and the public key A of the central reconfiguration server are
stored on the device. It is assumed that the distributor prefers to trust as little
outsiders as possible. Hence, a public-key protocol without TTP is opted for.
The above specifications and properties result in the choice of the Station-To-
Station (STS) protocol [45]. To fulfil the requirement of not using a TTP to
verify the public keys, the full STS protocol is used. The STS protocol offers
mutual entity authentication, mutual explicit key authentication, mutual key
confirmation and perfect forward secrecy. The latter is defined in [45] as: a
protocol is said to have perfect forward secrecy, if compromise of long-term keys
does not compromise past session keys.
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Table 4.1 shows the full STS protocol using some custom notations. A digital
signature with a private key x on a message M is noted: Sx(M). Encrypting a
messageM with a symmetric key x is noted: Ex[M ], while Dx[M ] represents the
according decryption of a message. Finally it is pointed out that in a public-key
pair (a,A) the lower case letter is the private key, while the corresponding upper
case letter is the public key.
The difference between STS and full STS is that the latter uses public key
certificates while the former does not. These public key certificates are digital
signatures, signed with the private key of the central reconfiguration server, on
the public key of the other entity. This allows each entity to verify the public key
of the other entity, by using the public key of the central reconfiguration server.
Table 4.1 also shows that the elliptic curve variant of STS is used. Digital
signatures are generated and verified using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) [60]. The reason for using elliptic curve cryptography is
key size. As can be read in [21], modular exponentiation and elliptic curve point
multiplication have an equivalent strength while the latter uses much smaller
keys than the former. This results in a smaller implementation.
After the completion of the full STS protocol, the shared secret is a point on
an elliptic curve, consisting of an X and Y coordinate which both are 256 bits
in size. Both coordinates are hashed to result in a 256-bit session key from
which two keys are obtained: key1 and key2, being the 128 left most and right
most bits respectively. The first key is used as key for the encryption of the
messages, while the second key is used to calculate the MAC. The 128 right
most bits of the X coordinate of the secret point on the elliptic curve are used
as initialisation vector for the symmetric-key cipher.
The full STS protocol, as shown in Table 4.1, uses a specific set of operations.
This set can be summarised as follows:
• random number generation
• elliptic curve point operations
• symmetric-key encryption/decryption
• generation and verification of a MAC
• generation and verification of digital signatures
In addition to this set of operations, a hash function is used to generate key1
and key2. This requirement is also needed for the generation and verification of
the digital signatures and is therefore not considered too costly.
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Table 4.1: The full Station-To-Station protocol
Central reconfiguration server Electronic Device with FPGA
key pair (a,A) key pair (b, B)
generator P generator P
CertA = Sa(A) CertB = Sa(B)
A
choose k1
Q1 = k1 ∗ P
X = Q1 X
→
choose k2
Q2 = k2 ∗ P
K = k2 ∗Q1
key1 || key2 = H(Kx,Ky)
Sb(Q2 ||Q1)
Ekey1 [Sb(Q2 ||Q1)]
Y = Q2 ||B || CertB || Ekey1 [Sb(Q2 ||Q1)]
Y
←
K = k1 ∗Q2
key1 || key2 = H(Kx,Ky)
Dkey1 [Ekey1 [Sb(Q2 ||Q1)]]
verify CertB
verify Sb(Q2||Q1), using B
Sa(Q1||Q2)
Ekey1 [Sa(Q1||Q2)]
Z = CertA || Ekey1 [Sa(Q1 ||Q2)] Z
→
Dkey1 [Ekey1 [Sa(Q1 ||Q2)]]
verify CertA
verify Sa(Q1 ||Q2), using A
The first four operations can be implemented using the implementations from
Chapter 2. The fifth operation can be realised by using these implementations
as well.
Figure 4.4 shows a graphical representation of the hierarchical levels of the
required operations in ECDSA: random number generation, elliptic curve
operations and the calculation of a hash value. The elliptic curve operations are
performed on the same datapath as the elliptic curve operations in the other
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steps of the STS protocol. Finally, the standardised Secure Hashing Algorithm
(SHA-256) with a digest length of 256 bits is part of the current standard and
is hence an acceptable choice [59].
ECDSA verification ECDSA generation
elliptic curve
point multiplication Hash
random 
number
generation
modular inversion elliptic curvepoint addition
elliptic curve
point doubling
modular multiplication modular addition
h
modular addition/subtraction
Figure 4.4: The hierarchical levels of the required operations in ECDSA,
according to [60]
4.2.3 Architecture
The top level architecture of the BisT and FisT solutions is shown in Figure 4.5.
The outer rectangle of Figure 4.5 represents the printed circuit board which
contains the FPGA and the external memory for implementing the BisT solution.
The FPGA is divided into a reconfigurable and static partition. While the former
is dedicated for the main application, the static partition holds the required
resources for the communication and the reconfiguration. The controlling
component in the static partition is a MicroBlaze softcore CPU, which uses a
single dual-ported BRAM which serves as data and instruction memory (IMEM
and DMEM) each with their own bus. The processor local bus (PLB) is used
to interconnect five peripherals: an Ethernetcore, the ICAP, the cryptocore,
either an external memory controller or a (set of) BRAM(s) and a placeholder
component for the reconfigurable partition. Whether the external memory or
the on-chip memory is used, depends on the implemented solution. For the
BisT solution the external memory controller is used, while the FisT solution
requires one or more BRAMs.
The ‘cryptocore’ is a custom-built peripheral which contains the implementations
of the four required cryptographic primitives. These four components are
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Figure 4.5: The top level architecture of the BisT and FisT solutions
interconnected through a shared BRAM and are coordinated by an FSM which
is interfaced through a command register (CR) and status register (SR). These
registers can be written or read through the PLB bus.
Figure 4.5 shows a connection of the reconfigurable partition to the PLB
bus. There are no functional connections through this bus. The placeholder
component could indicate the contrary, but only the reset and clock signals
come in through this ‘connection’ because their input/output buffers to the
physical connections are taken up by the static system. The need for such
a placeholder component comes from the implied tool flow that comes with
PlanAhead, the vendor tool for implementing partial reconfiguration designs.
4.2.4 Software on the CPU
A short explanation on getting software, which has to run on the MicroBlaze,
into a bitstream is given in Section 3.2.2.
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The MicroBlaze communicates with the central reconfiguration server using
an Ethernet connection with the UDP/IP protocol. Reasons for choosing the
UDP protocol over the TCP protocol are given in Section 3.2. The software
running on the MicroBlaze starts by initialising the Ethernet softcore and
initialising constant parameters which are mainly used for program offsets,
network settings, padding messages for the HASH/HMAC component and the
keys used in the scheme. After the initialisation the MicroBlaze keeps polling
the Ethernet component for incoming instructions, following a flowchart as
depicted in Figure 4.6.
The MicroBlaze first handles possible requests using the address resolution
protocol to find the Media Access Control (MAC) address of the network
interface card with a certain IP address. When an IPv4 packet destined for
the FPGA arrives, the requested action is looked for in the first payload byte.
This action can be a message of either the key establishment protocol or the
reconfiguration protocol.
Upon receiving the first message of the STS protocol, the MicroBlaze handles
the next steps of the full STS protocol. If a single check in the protocol fails,
the MicroBlaze interrupts the remaining steps and waits for the first message
of the STS protocol again. When the third message of the STS protocol
arrives, the MicroBlaze finishes the protocol and sends a MAC-ed and encrypted
acknowledgement.
Depending on the size of the reconfigurable partition, the size of the partial
bitstream also varies. The maximum payload which can be sent in a single,
default UDP frame is 1 4728 bytes. Since the aim in this application is to
get the reconfigurable partition as large as possible, it is assumed that the
partial bitstream will not fit in a single UDP frame. The simple reconfiguration
protocol organises this administration.
The partial bitstream will have to be divided into multiple chunks. A MAC
is appended to every bitstream chunk using key2. This bitstream chunk and
its MAC are encrypted using key1. The reconfiguration protocol handles three
types of requests:
1. receive an encrypted bitstream chunk with MAC
2. check the validity of the received bitstream
3. reconfigure the FPGA
8The 1 500 bytes maximum payload of an Ethernet frame minus the IP header and UDP
header of respectively 20 and 8 bytes results in a 1 472 bytes payload.
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Figure 4.6: Flowchart of the software running on the MicroBlaze after
initialisation
The first type of requests accepts an encrypted bitstream chunk together with
its MAC and stores it in memory on an address based on the order number. For
the BisT solution this is in external memory, while the FisT solution stores the
payload on-chip. The reason for using the order mechanism is that the UDP
protocol cannot guarantee that the chunks arrive in the same order as they are
sent by the central reconfiguration server. The possible re-ordering has to be
done by the receiver.
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When all chunks are sent, the central reconfiguration server can ask the
MicroBlaze to check the validity of the received bitstream, which is the second
type of request. Upon such a request, the distributor also has to send a
MAC on the entire partial bitstream. The MicroBlaze will scan the memory,
decrypting every encrypted chunk on the FPGA and verifying every MAC on a
chunk. Subsequently the MAC on the entire bitstream is verified. If this latter
verification succeeds, it is certain that 1) every chunk has been received; 2) the
correct order of the chunks has been restored; 3) the received partial bitstream
is unaltered; and 4) the partial bitstream was sent by the central reconfiguration
server and is therefore trusted. Only upon a correct verification of the MAC on
the entire partial bitstream a flag in the MicroBlaze’s data memory is set. This
flag signals that a correct partial bitstream is available. After setting this flag,
every MAC on a single bitstream chunk is removed to obtain a non-segmented
partial bitstream. Additionally for the FisT solution, every chunk is decrypted
resulting in a continuous decrypted compressed bitstream. The evolution of the
data in memory is visualised in Figure 4.7.
out-of-order
chunk
incoming chunks           complete              continuous     continuous
                                     encrypted              decrypted      encrypted
                                      bitstream               bitstream       bitstream
Figure 4.7: The evolution of the memory storing the bitstream chunks
The third type of requests accepted by the MicroBlaze is the writing of the
partial bitstream to the ICAP. However, this only happens if the internal flag,
mentioned above, is set. In the BisT solution every chunk has to be decrypted
on the FPGA before moving it to the ICAP. In the FisT solution the data
decompression has to be performed prior to moving the chunk to the ICAP. After
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writing the partial bitstream to the ICAP, the behaviour of the reconfigurable
partition is updated.
Up until this point the BisT and FisT solutions are not too different from
each other. The remainder of this section will be considered for both solutions
separately.
Board-is-Trusted
Given that the maximum payload of a single UDP frame is 1472 bytes, one can
determine the chunk size. There are two9 additional bytes to store the order
number and 32 additional bytes for the MAC. This leaves 1438 available bytes
for actual chunk data. This fits 89 AES blocks of 128 bits, which results in a
chunk size of 1424 bytes. The packet payload and its generation procedure for
the BisT solution are visualised in Figure 4.8.
partial bitstream
segmented partial bitstream
encryption with key1
MAC with key2
padded UDP/IP payload
AES-128
in OFB
HMAC
##2d
Figure 4.8: The UDP/IP packet payload and its generation procedure used in
the BisT solution
FPGA-is-Trusted
For the FisT solution the available storage is scarce. To be able to store
the partial bitstream on the on-chip memory, data compression is required.
Note that most research on bitstream compression is performed to reduce the
configuration time of the FPGA, while the goal in the FisT solution is to avoid
the need for external memory.
9A full bitstream for the XC5VFX70T is 3’378’269 bytes which fits 2’373 (0x0945) chunks.
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There exist many compression algorithms that offer lossless data compression.
It needs no further explanation that lossy compression algorithms are unsuitable.
For clarity it is noted that the compression ratio (CR) is defined as:
CR =
size(compressed bitstream)
size(original bitstream)
Many algorithms are based on: Lempel-Ziv algorithms, Huffman encoding
and/or run-length encoding. Lempel-Ziv-based algorithms focus on substitutions
of repeating occurrences, which are maintained in a dictionary [84]. Huffman
coding uses short words to represent frequently occurring words, while
infrequently occurring words are represented by longer words. For decompression
the Huffman tree needs to be reconstructed. This is considered to be
costly [13, 36]. Run-length encoding is a very simple technique, that compresses
the data by indicating consecutive repetitions in the data. The compressed
output will exist of pairs of (w, l) describing the content of the input. The
w field defines the word, while the l field gives the number of repetitions. All
three mentioned algorithms have a fixed word-size in a given compression, but
this word-size is adjustable.
Given that the maximum payload of a single UDP frame is 1472 bytes, one can
determine the chunk size. There are two additional bytes to store the order
number, analogous to the BisT solution, and 32 additional bytes for the MAC.
This leaves 1438 available bytes for actual chunk data. One byte is reserved for
the length of w and two bytes are reserved for the length of l. These three bytes
serve as metadata for the compression of the chunk. This fits 89 AES blocks of
128 bits, which results in a chunk size of 1424 bytes. The packet payload and
its generation procedure for the FisT solution are visualised in Figure 4.9.
4.2.5 Implementation results
Area
Table 4.2 summarises the required resources for the BisT and FisT solution, on
a Xilinx ML507 development board containing a Xilinx XC5VFX70T FPGA.
The tools used to quantify the required resources are part of the Xilinx ISE
Design Suite, version 14. Figure 4.12 shows the floorplan of the FPGA with
the placed and routed designs, for the BisT (left) and FisT (right) solution. A
graphical representation of the relative resource usage is shown in Figure 4.10
and Figure 4.11.
The cryptocore in its entirety uses around 25% of the targeted FPGA. The
efforts for making a small implementation of the cryptographic components pay
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Figure 4.9: The UDP/IP packet payload and its generation procedure used in
the FisT solution
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Figure 4.10: Relative resource usage
of the BisT solution
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Figure 4.11: Relative resource usage
of the FisT solution
off, but Table 4.2, Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 also indicate that the cost of the
cryptocore is still relatively high. It is pointed out that the optimisation by the
design tools, on the whole of the static partition, forces a more efficient usage
of the resources.
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Table 4.2: Resource usage of the cryptocore and both partitions
Number of
component Slices BRAM DSP48E
BisT: Cryptocore1 2 378 21 7
BisT: Static partition 5 702 65 10
BisT: Available in Static partition 6 640 86 80
BisT: Available in Reconfigurable partition 4 560 62 48
FisT: Cryptocore2 3 305 15 2
FisT: Static partition 3 392 49 5
FisT: Available in Static partition 3 840 52 32
FisT: Available in Reconfigurable partition 7 360 96 96
Available in XC5VLX20T 3 120 26 24
Available in XC5VFX70T 11 200 148 128
Available in XC5VLX330T 51 840 324 192
1: contains impl10 + impl20 + impl30 + impl40, from Table 2.13
2: contains impl10 + impl20 + impl31 + impl41, from Table 2.13
The additional resources occupied by the static partition contain the MicroBlaze
with its peripherals. For the BisT solution, this includes the external memory
component while the FisT solution contains a single BRAM and its interface.The
software for both solutions fits in the single BRAM used by the MicroBlaze.
From Table 4.2 it is clear that the static partition has more reconfigurable
resources available than is required. How to make the segmentation in the static
and the reconfigurable partition is mostly determined by the size of the static
partition’s content, but for the FisT solution, also depends on the size of the
main application. If the size of the main application is larger, additional storage
to save the new configuration is required. This makes determining where the
border between static and reconfigurable partitions is to be placed, a difficult
and application-specific task.
Figure 4.12 shows the placed-and-routed full bitstreams for the BisT and FisT
solution. The marked boxes on both floorplans, indicate the reconfigurable
partitions of the FPGA in both solutions. As is clear from the figure, the
constraints in both solutions differ significantly. This has no technical reason,
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but illustrates how the segmentation can vary. The density in the static partition
of the BisT solution is visually lower than in the FisT solution. The results in
Table 4.2 numerically support this by indicating that the static partition of the
BisT solution has more unused resources than the FisT solution. The routing
through the reconfigurable partitions are the reset and clock signals and routing
from and to inputs and outputs.
reconfigurable partition
BisT solution                                                                                      FisT solution
Figure 4.12: The placed-and-routed full bitstreams for the BisT (left) and FisT
(right) solutions
Finally, Figure 4.13 shows the resource usage of both the BisT and FisT
implementation on recent Xilinx FPGAs. These results compare the number
of occupied resources to the available resources without taking in account the
possible optimisations that come with these newer devices or with more recent
development software.
90 APPLICATION: TOWARDS A SINGLE-CHIP, SECURE, REMOTE FPGA RECONFIGURATION
The substantial overhead of both solutions is minimised on the more recent and
larger FPGAs.
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Figure 4.13: The relative resource usage of both solutions on recent Xilinx
FPGAs
Speed
The focus of the complete design for both solutions is on minimal area rather
than on maximal speed. Nevertheless, to report on the timing of the design, a
small led visualisation application is implemented as main application.
For the BisT solution, the full bitstream is 3’378’281 bytes in size, while the
partial bitstream is 62’357 bytes. The partial bitstream which is sent over the
network requires padding for cryptographic operations and encapsulation for
the network transfer. This results in a partial bitstream of 64’480 bytes.
Table 4.3 on page 98 shows the results of timing of the different types of FPGA
reconfigurations. These measurements were taken on a local lab network. When
reconfiguring the FPGA using a JTAG connection, the shares of duration of the
communication and the reconfiguration are not available. This table indicates
that the overhead of the cryptographic protocol is equal to the data transfer
time for small bitstreams. This ratio will improve when bitstreams get larger.
The timing results mentioned above can vary heavily in other setups and designs.
The first and most important reason is that the size of the partial bitstream is
proportional to the size of the reconfigurable partition. The second reason is
that the latency of the network has a substantial influence on the duration of
the communication.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Security
The cryptographic protocol, as described in Section 4.2.2, uses a session key
for every new communication session. During key establishment, both entities
can authenticate each other by using the certificate. Using the session key
guarantees that the transfer of the partial bitstream is confidential because
of AES in OFB mode and that the FPGA on the device is certain of the
authenticity of the data because of the HMAC. Up to this point, the security
is ensured by the strength of the algorithms chosen in Section 4.2.2 and by
protecting the cryptographic keys, both the private key and the session keys
from active and passive attackers as well as from intrusive and non-intrusive
attackers.
At the moment of writing, the private key is stored in the pass-through memory,
on a default address. As proof-of-concept this can work, but it is not a design
practice as there are two main issues.
A first issue is that the bitstream that brings up the static system, contains
the private key. By eavesdropping this initial configuration, the intrusive and
non-intrusive attacker could learn the private key. There is a possibility of
encrypting the initial bitstream, but this does not solve the problem. The first
reason is a published attack on encrypted bitstreams by Moradi et al. [51]. A
second reason is that this would only move the issue of storing the private
key of the FPGA to storing the symmetric key, used for the encrypted, initial
configuration.
The second issue with storing the private key in the pass-through memory is the
fact that this key resides at a constant address in a well defined set of BRAMs.
This could allow fault injection attacks, as introduced by Carreira et al. in [7].
A solution for storing the private key could be obtained from Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUFs) as introduced by Gassend et al. [23]. These functions can
collect unique information, based on physical properties of a specific device.
This information can be used to generate the private key, as presented by Maes
et al. in [42].
As discussed in the threat model, the intrusive attacker can also attack the device
physically. A first method for attacking the system can be very simple. Pulling
the power plug off the board, removing the UTP cable, and other physical
interventions result in a denial of service (DOS) attack. Since protecting against
such attacks needs to be done in the physical world, these attacks fall outside of
the scope of this work. Another type of DOS could be to flood the MicroBlaze
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with obsolete requests. This type of DOS attack should be held off at the
network level.
A second method is for intrusive and non-intrusive attackers to perform a timing
attack [38]. This type of attack tries to gain information from measuring time
during specific operations of the device. In Table 4.1 a timing attack could be
used to try to steal the random number k2 from the calculation Q2 = k2 ∗ P .
With k2 obtained from a timing attack and Q1 sent in plain text, key K can be
calculated and so the session key could get stolen, thus breaking the scheme.
To protect against timing attacks the implemented method for calculating the
elliptic curve point multiplication is the Montgomery ladder instead of a faster,
straightforward approach. Doing so results in a longer but time-constant path,
independent of k2.
As a third method, intrusive and non-intrusive attackers can do side-channel
analysis attacks. Only side-channel analysis attacks on power traces are discussed
here, since countermeasures against other types of side-channel analysis attacks
have not been implemented. A SPA attack on power traces is not applicable
because of the use of the Montgomery ladder (explained in Section 1.3.4). The
threat for differential power analysis attacks on the ECP, calculating Q2, is
minimal because k2 ∗ P is performed with a random scalar with every iteration
of the protocol.
The session key is the result of key material chosen at the distributor site and
at the site of the electronic device. This ensures the freshness of the session
key, preventing replay attacks. With the incoming partial bitstreams being
encrypted and having a MAC, both with the freshly generated session key, and
with the presence of the internal flag of having received a complete and valid
bitstream, spoofing and replay attacks are countered.
In [5], Blake-Wilson and Menezes have published unknown-key-share attacks
on the STS protocol. This attack can result in a situation where the central
reconfiguration and the electronic device do share a generated session key, but
the electronic device is convinced it shares a key with an unknown entity. This
attack can be prevented by moving the certificates in the second and third pass
of the full STS protocol inside the encryption. This can be achieved at almost
no additional overhead.
4.3.2 Reconfiguration protocol
It is pointed out that the proposed protocol might be slow. However, this is not
considered an issue because the main application can continue working during
this communication. The actual downtime of the main application is limited
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to the time window it takes to read the partial bitstream from memory and
write it to the ICAP. This downtime is proportional to the size of the partial
bitstream and therefore proportional to the size of the reconfigurable partition.
The reconfiguration protocol can be used as described above. Nevertheless,
improvements can be applied. Four important improvements are discussed.
Reducing the MAC size
A considerable improvement to the protocol is to shrink the size of the MAC.
This would allow to reduce storage requirements of both the BisT and FisT
solution. With the file size defined as f and the MAC size as m, the relative
memory overhead, defined as rmoh, is given in Equation (4.1).
rmoh = newfilesize
originalfilesize
− 1 = f + numofblocks ∗m
f
− 1
= f(1 472−m) ∗
m
f
= m1 472−m, (4.1)
with
numofblocks = f(1 472−m)
and
0 ≤ m < 1 472.
Equation (4.1) indicates that using a 32-bit MAC instead of a 256-bit MAC,
reduces the relative memory overhead from 2.22% to 0.27%. Although shrinking
the size of the MAC reduces the overhead in area, it must be ensured the
security is not affected. In [57], NIST discusses the recommended length of a
MAC. They disapprove lengths smaller than 32 bits and discourage lengths that
are smaller than 64 bits. The latter would result in a 0.55% overhead which is
still four times less than the implemented solution.
Optimal use of the individual MACs in chunks
Both in the BisT and FisT solution, every chunk is sent together with a MAC
on the chunk. Although not discussed nor implemented in this chapter, this
can be useful. If the validation of the MAC on the complete partial bitstream
fails, not every chunk needs to be resent. Simply verifying which chunks contain
errors, could result in only having to resend the erroneous or missing chunks.
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Inter-chunk parameter adjustment
The CR obtained from textbook run-length encoding comes with a downside.
Compressing high-entropy data will have a smaller impact because performing
run-length encoding on high-entropy data will increase the data size rather
than reduce it. Exhaustively searching for the optimal word and length sizes
on partial bitstreams chunks can increase the CR. Although not yet used, the
chunk header offers the possibility to adjust the word and length sizes (w and
l) of the run-length encoding, between chunks.
To find these optimal word and length sizes for all chunks, every possible word
and length size should be tried and compared. This iterative process begins by
applying all qualifying word and length combinations in a run-length encoding
of the partial bitstream. If the most optimal CR results in a chunk-size below
the maximum available payload size10, this particular branch ends. When the
maximum available payload size is exceeded, the non-encoded chunk is halved.
The iterative search process restarts on both parts. This exhaustive search is
visualised in Figure 4.14, while Figure 4.15 shows the tiny modification in the
payload generation.
Figure 4.14: Exhaustive search to find optimal word and length sizes
An exploration of the possible gains in CR is executed. The CRs of four encoded
bitstreams are compared using different approaches to RLE. Bitstream01
contains a design of a single GPS channel, bitstream02 contains the design of
Chapter 3, bitstream03 contains the design of a textbook 1024-bit wide ripple-
carry adder, and bitstream 04 contains the design of a video encoder. This
10This is the maximum Ethernet payload minus the IP, UDP and reconfiguration headers
(1500-20-8-7).
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Figure 4.15: The UDP/IP packet payload and its generation procedure used in
the FisT solution with inter-chunk parameter adjustment
comparison is shown in Figure 4.16. First there is the compression using RLE
of which the worst and best CRs are compared. Subsequently, an exhaustive
search on RLE with word and length sizes smaller than 8 bits are added in
the comparison. This is indicated with subbyte-run-length encoding (sbRLE).
Finaly, the effect on the CR of the inter-chunk parameter adjustment is added
to the comparison, with and without subbyte-RLE. To position these results,
the CR of compressing the bitstreams with gzip and 7z, two commonly used
compression tools, are added.
Change order of MAC and encryption
The order of the MAC and the encryption of the chunks in both the BisT and
FisT solution is identical. First, a MAC is calculated on the chunk. Secondly,
the concatenation of the chunk and its MAC is encrypted.
In [3], Bellare and Namprempre compare three different approaches in combining
an encryption and a MAC. The approach used in this chapter is in their
work referred to as MAC-then-encrypt. The two other approaches are:
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Figure 4.16: Comparison of the CR between textbook RLE, RLE on sub-byte
level and RLE with inter-chunk parameter adjustment
Encrypt-and-MAC and Encrypt-then-MAC. Applied to the BisT and FisT
solution, the Encrypt-and-MAC solution would come down to concatenating
the encrypted chunk and the MAC on the chunk. The Encrypt-then-MAC
approach would encrypt the chunk and append a MAC on this encrypted chunk.
Bellare and Namprempre make a short comparison of these three methods and
their properties. Their result, assuming that the MAC is strongly unforgeable,
indicates that switching to Encrypt-then-MAC would offer more complete
security. Both for the BisT and FisT solutions, this can be achieved at next to
no extra area cost.
Within the European Network of Excellence for Cryptology (ECRYPT), the
Directions In Authenticated Ciphers (DIAC) workshop is organised. This
workshop has started a competition in search for authenticated encryption
algorithms: Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability,
and Robustness (CAESAR). The results of this competition could be an
alternative for the combination of the MAC and encryption.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter a prototype is presented to equip electronic devices, running on an
FPGA, with the feature of secure, remote reconfiguration. To obtain this feature
a suitable cryptographic protocol is chosen and the required cryptographic
primitives to execute the protocol, are implemented. In both the BisT and FisT
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solutions, the focus is on area rather than on speed in order to keep the static
partition as small as possible, thus leaving maximum resources for the main
application.
The full STS protocol ensures data confidentiality, data authenticity and mutual
entity authentication between the distributor, who initiates an update or upgrade
remotely, and the FPGA in the electronic device. With these features ensured,
partial bitstreams can be sent securely. The implementation resists timing
attacks and simple power analysis attacks. However, fault injection attacks and
DOS attacks are not covered.
Two solutions have been presented. The first solution trusts the PCB on which
the FPGA resides, while the second solution only trusts the FPGA. The small
differences in the reconfiguration protocol and the implementation are discussed.
This chapter has been published in the proceedings of the International
Conference on ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs [74] and the proceedings
of the International Workshop on Reconfigurable Communication-centric
Systems-on-Chip [6], and is accepted for publication in the ACM Transactions
on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems journal.
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Chapter 5
Application: Licensing
scheme
This chapter describes the third application of the thesis: a proof-of-concept
implementation of a licensing scheme. The original pay-per-use licensing scheme
is developed by Maes et al. [41]. They describe the complete scheme but also
mention some challenges in building an implementation. Our contribution,
which is described from Section 5.2 onward, is twofold: it provides solutions
for these challenges and it provides a proof-of-concept implementation of the
licensing scheme, by using the GoAhead tool and the differential bitstream
generation technique.
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Situating the application
Hardware designs are made for a wide variety of applications. The devices
for which these designs are tailored are also getting more complex and more
powerful. Additionally, the techniques available for developing hardware designs
are continuously improved. This makes the design of efficient hardware an
increasingly complex task. Rather than starting each hardware design from
scratch, reusing already designed components becomes common practice.
With the complexity of individual components increasing, a new market of
designing and selling IP cores has been introduced. With reconfigurable
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hardware, such as FPGAs, these IP cores can be implemented easily and
dynamically. Moreover, their reconfigurability allows IP cores to be software
and/or hardware in contrast to the firmware updates of microprocessors which
only target software updates.
With the risk of loosing IP, and therefore money, a number of solutions have been
proposed. Simpson and Schaumont describe an oﬄine authentication scheme for
embedded software IP modules in FPGAs [69]. Besides this software-oriented
approach, a number of hardware solutions were proposed [19, 22, 25, 41]. In [22],
a proof-of-concept implementation is presented to reconfigure the majority of
the FPGA such that it has a design, containing a specific IP core. However,
this does not provide a flexible way of obtaining and implementing one or
more IP cores. None of the other solutions ([19, 25, 41]) were implemented in
practice, but the work of Maes et al. [41] elaborates the most on practical issues.
Moreover, their work offers the pay-per-use feature where the system developer
pays a price for the IP core per device in which it is instantiated. The scheme of
Maes et al. is based on the property of FPGAs to support partial and dynamic
reconfiguration.
Although Maes et al. worked out their pay-per-use licensing scheme to a detailed
level, it still leaves considerable practical aspects untouched. In this chapter,
the practical feasibility of their scheme is evaluated. As already partly indicated
by the authors of [41], the proposed architecture is vulnerable to side-channel
attacks. Additionally, commercially available tools do not allow nested and
flexible placement of IP cores. An improved scheme and architecture are
presented that give a solution to the nesting and flexibility issues. In addition, a
novel technique is described to decrease the area overhead. In order to achieve
a more secure, practically implementable, and smaller solution, the tool flow
is based on the academic tool GoAhead [2]. The result is a working FPGA
implementation with a small overhead in area. This is the first implementation
of a pay-per-use licensing scheme for hardware IP cores.
5.1.2 Threat model
There are four entities that participate in the scheme: the FPGA vendor,
the metering authority, the IP core vendor and the system developer. The
interactions between the different entities are shown in Figure 5.1. The scheme
consists of an initialisation phase and a design phase. Both are detailly described
in Section 5.1.3.
Although it is not obvious to achieve in practice, the initialisation is assumed
to occur securely. Sending an FPGA between entities will probably result in
different people having physical access to the FPGA. Securing this may better
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Figure 5.1: The four entities in the scheme and their interactions as described
in [41]
be solved in the physical world. It is also assumed that IP specific keys are sent
over a secure channel, which might imply other cryptographic techniques.
In the design phase, the communications between the IP core vendor and the
system developer require cryptographic protection; they fall outside of the scope
of this chapter. The threats, against which this implementation tries to secure,
are attacks on the communication between the trusted third party and the
system developer.
It is assumed that an attacker can store every message that is sent between the
metering authority and the system designer, and that he/she also has physical
access to the FPGA. This could enable an attacker to eavesdrop communicated
and off-line bitstreams and that he/she can perform power side-channel analysis
attacks.
5.1.3 A summary of the scheme [41]
As mentioned above, the scheme consists of an initialisation phase and a design
phase that are both described below in detail.
Initialisation phase
When the FPGA vendor produces an FPGA F ∗i , the device can be sent to a
metering authority for registration (transaction 1 in Figure 5.1). The metering
authority generates a random device key kFi and metering key kMi and stores
these keys in a database together with the ID of the FPGA: ID(F i). Further,
the metering authority stores the device key kFi in the secure NVM of the
FPGA. This memory is secure in the sense that the stored key can only be
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accessed from the bitstream decryption engine. Once the FPGA is configured,
the key cannot be read from the reconfigurable fabric. The metering authority
will additionally encrypt a bitstream, using the key kFi . This bitstream is
called the metering bitstream and it contains the metering design M which
includes a register that stores the metering key kMi . The metering bitstream
Bi(M ||kMi ) is computed as Bi(M ||kMi ) = EkFi [b(M ||kMi )], where Ex[M ] stands
for a symmetric-key encryption of a message M using key x, and b(x||y) stands
for a plain text bitstream that implements hardware components x and y. The
uninitialised FPGA F ∗i is now transformed into a registered FPGA Fi, which is
handed back to the FPGA vendor, together with Bi(M ||kMi ) (transaction 2 in
Figure 5.1).
When a system developer buys an FPGA, possibly as component on a
development board, which is enabled to use the licensing scheme, the FPGA Fi
is delivered, together with Bi(M ||kMi ) (transaction 3 in Figure 5.1).
IP core vendors also need to register their cores through the metering authority.
They have to register every offered IP core by providing the metering authority
with an ID of the IP core, ID(IPj), together with a key, kIPj (transaction 4 in
Figure 5.1). Both the metering authority and the IP core vendor store ID(IPj)
and kIPj in a database.
Design phase
When a system developer wants to obtain and use an IP core in a specific
FPGA, the following interactions occur. The system developer requests the IP
core identified by ID(IPj) from the IP core vendor (transaction 5 in Figure 5.1).
This results in the IP core vendor sending the bitstream of the IP core to the
system developer, encrypted with the key kIPj , i.e. B(IPj) = EkIPj [b(IPj)]
(transaction 6 in Figure 5.1). After transactions 5 and 6 the system developer
cannot use the IP core because the decryption key is not yet available.
When the system developer wants to integrate the core in his/her design, the
IDs of the FPGA (ID(F i)) and the IP core (ID(IPj)) are sent to the metering
authority (transaction 7 in Figure 5.1). The metering authority generates a
license KIPi,j , with KIPi,j = EkMi [k
IP
j ], which is sent to the system developer
(transaction 8 in Figure 5.1).
The system developer then configures the FPGA Fi with bitstream Bi(M ||kMi ),
which allows the key kMi to get on the FPGA. Using kMi , the system decrypts
the license (KIPi,j ) to obtain kIPj , which is used to decrypt the encrypted IP
core B(IPj) on the FPGA, in order to configure the IP core in the system
developer’s design through partial reconfiguration.
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During the design phase, after all transactions in Figure 5.1 have been performed,
the architecture implemented on the FPGA is altered a few times. This
evolution is depicted in Figure 5.2, where the white area represents the
reconfigurable resources of the FPGA, while the grey area holds additional
dedicated components available on the die of the FPGA. It is pointed out that
the ICAP is permanently present in the reconfigurable part. In every step
of Figure 5.2 incoming data is used to update registers or to reconfigure the
FPGA. The targeted components of the incoming data are indicated by the
black, dashed arrows.
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Figure 5.2: The evolution of the FPGA architecture in [41] during the design
phase. The Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) stores the device key for the on-chip
decryption core.
The top left image visualises how Bi(M ||kMi ) configures the metering design and
the metering key in the FPGA through a full configuration. This configuration
uses the on-chip bitstream decryption core which is available on the FPGA, using
the key kFi which is stored in NVM. The partial reconfigurations of the FPGA
that follow in a later phase do not alter the metering design. Therefore, we refer
to the part of the FPGA that holds the metering design as the ‘static part’,
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while the remainder of the FPGA is reserved for the system developer’s design
together with the IP cores.
The top right image in Figure 5.2 shows the second step, in which the metering
design, consisting of a custom AES decryption core and two registers (of which
one contains the metering key kMi ), is already present in the static part of
the FPGA. The license KIPi,j is decrypted by the custom decryption core on
the reconfigurable fabric of the FPGA, using key kMi , which results in the
initialisation of the already implemented register for kIPj . It should be noted
that this step performs no configuration, but the initialisation of a key in a
register.
The bottom image shows the incoming, encrypted bitstream B(IPj), containing
the obtained IP core. This bitstream is decrypted by the custom decryption core,
using key kIPj , and is routed to the ICAP. This results in a partial reconfiguration
of the FPGA to implement the design of the IP core.
5.2 Implementation
5.2.1 Issues in implementing the licensing scheme
As already partly indicated by Maes et al., the implementation of the licensing
scheme leads to a number of practical issues. In this section we explain the two
most important issues.
Side-channel security of the embedded AES core
The original scheme uses the dedicated AES bitstream decryption core on the
die of the FPGA for the full configuration of the initial system. In [41], Maes
et al. already mention the work of Moradi et al., that presents a side-channel
attack on the built-in AES core [51]. The attack reveals the key that is used
to decrypt encrypted bitstreams. In the licensing scheme, this means that kFi
can be revealed during the decryption of Bi(M ||kMi ). With kFi , the attacker
can decrypt Bi(M ||kMi ) outside the FPGA to obtain kMi . This would reveal
kIPj from the license, which can finally be used to decrypt the partial bitstream
containing the obtained IP core. An in-depth study of this bitstream can reveal
implementation details of the IP core which threatens the work of the IP core
vendor. Note that Maes et al. use a custom AES decryption core for the partial
bitstreams, since decryption of a partial bitstream was not supported by the
on-chip core.
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Nested and flexible integration of IP cores
As shown in Figure 5.2, the metering design resides in the static part of
the FPGA. The system developer’s design is a partial module that covers the
remaining part of the FPGA. Since the obtained IP core will be placed inside the
system designer’s hardware, the IP core needs to be nested as a partial module
inside the system developer’s design. This requires the ability of performing
nested partial reconfiguration, which is not supported by commercial tools.
Moreover, flexible placement of IP cores is not allowed either, which means that
an IP core can only be implemented at a predetermined location on the FPGA.
Maes et al. support this by having the IP core vendor tailor the obtained IP
core to the system developer’s needs. However, this increases the design time
and the IP core price and results in a non-flexible, non-scalable solution.
5.2.2 Overcoming the issues
Side-channel security of the embedded AES core
The original architecture in [41] uses the on-chip AES decryption core for full
configuration and uses a custom AES core in the reconfigurable logic of the
FPGA in order to decrypt licenses and partial bitstreams, as explained in
Section 5.1.3. To solve the side-channel security issues of the on-chip AES core,
there are two solutions. Either the on-chip AES core needs to be replaced by
a side-channel secure core or a work-around needs to be found based on the
existing FPGA technology. Because the former is the responsibility of the FPGA
vendor and because a solution for existing FPGAs is desirable, the vulnerable
on-chip AES core is not used. Instead only the custom AES core is used in the
reconfigurable logic for all decryptions.
This core needs to be configured in the FPGA which is done with an encrypted
bitstream, Binit, that also contains a connection to the ICAP and a storage unit
for both the metering key kMi and the IP core key kIPj . Next, the encrypted
bitstream Bi(M ||kMi ) is sent to the FPGA and gets decrypted by the custom
AES core. According to the original scheme, Bi(M ||kMi ) contains a register that
holds kMi , an AES decryption component, and a connection to the ICAP. Since
the AES decryption component and the connection to the ICAP were already
implemented by Binit, the only new component in Bi(M ||kMi ) is the metering
key kMi . The encrypted bitstream Bi(M ||kMi ) is decrypted with key kFi , which
is available inside the FPGA after the initialisation phase. The implementation
of the custom AES core is based on the work of Moradi et al. [52].
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Note that no precautions have been taken to prevent an attacker from altering
the encrypted bitstream Binit through the techniques of Moradi et al. [51]. This
full reconfiguration uses the vulnerable on-chip core, but the design of Binit
does not contain sensitive data. However, an attacker could make connections
between the key storage and the outside world to simply eavesdrop every key.
Because doing this on a placed-and-routed design is considered to be difficult,
we do not take precautions to prevent this attack in this proof-of-concept
implementation.
Nested and flexible integration of IP cores
Commercially available tools for partial reconfiguration do not allow partial
modules to be nested. Koch et al. developed an academic tool called ReCoBus-
Builder [37] that evolved into the GoAhead tool [2], which does allow nested
partial reconfiguration. This tool heavily relies on the Xilinx Design Language
(XDL) [81] to achieve its unique features. Therefore, the use of the tool binds the
scheme to Xilinx FPGAs. Further, GoAhead also allows the flexible placement
of reconfigurable modules in contrast to a predetermined location of modules
using commercial tools. This makes our solution more practical, cheaper and less
cumbersome for both the IP core vendor and the system developer. An additional
benefit of using GoAhead is that partial reconfiguration on the Spartan-6 FPGA
family becomes possible, which is not feasible using commercial tools.
5.2.3 Additional improvements to the architecture
In order to decrease the resource occupation of the static partition that handles
the licensing scheme, an alternative method for key storage is implemented.
In the original scheme, only the metering key (kMi ) and the IP core key (kIPj )
are stored in the flip-flops of the FPGA, since these are the keys used for the
custom decryption core. The device key (kFi ) is stored in a memory element that
drives the built-in AES decryptor. As explained in Section 5.2.2 our solution
uses the custom AES core for all decryptions, which means three keys have to
be stored. The next section describes how traditional storage of the keys is
done, while the section thereafter explains how the novel approach allows the
storage of three keys using only half the area compared to the storage of two
keys using the traditional method. Moreover, in the traditional setting, two
additional reconfigurable partitions are needed for the storage of the keys, while
our approach does not need any further partitioning in the static partition.
This leads to additional savings in area and timing, since the interconnection of
partial modules with the rest of the FPGA introduces an overhead in area and
timing.
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The traditional way: key storage in slice flip-flops
Upon initial configuration, the registers for storing kMi and kIPj are empty.
During two partial reconfiguration steps the partial bitstream Bi(M ||kMi ) and
the license KIPi,j store kMi and kIPj in these registers. Assuming AES-128 is used
for encryption, each register holds a 128-bit key. Given that one slice contains
eight flip-flops (for a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA), the two registers require 32
slices.
The improved way: key storage in configuration memory
In order to reduce the overhead used by the key registers, the storage of the keys
is moved from the slice flip-flops to the ‘configuration memory’ of the FPGA by
using the configuration bits of the LUTs.
LUT5
LUT5
A6
A[5:1]
O6
O5
SRAM memory
Figure 5.3: Architecture of a LUT6 in a Spartan-6 FPGA
Figure 5.3 shows the architecture of a LUT6 of a Spartan-6 FPGA with 6 inputs
and 2 outputs. This LUT6 can be configured as a single 6-to-1 LUT or as two
5-to-1 LUTs. Any function with n inputs (with 1 ≤ n < 6)can be configured
in a LUT, resulting in 2n possible functions. Among these functions are two
functions that map any given input to ‘0’ or to ‘1’, e.g. F1 and F16 in Table 1.2.
Configuring both 5-to-1 LUTs through the SRAM memory to one of these two
functions, turns a single LUT6 in a 2-bit ROM. The value of the ROM is stored
in the configuration memory. Since we need to provide the AES core with 128
key bits in parallel, we need 64 LUTs or 16 slices for the storage of one key.
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Due to reasons explained above, there are three keys to be stored, namely kFi ,
kMi and kIPj . By altering the truth table of the LUT-as-2-bit-ROM as shown
in Table 5.1, the single LUT can hold 2 bits of all three keys. This means
that the 16 occupied slices can store all three keys. From a functional point
of view, the achieved behaviour could be represented as shown in Figure 5.4.
The configuration bits of the LUT determine the value of the 2-bit ROMs and
therefore determine 2 bits of each key. Each LUT has a truth table as shown in
Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Truth table of the LUTs in the key storage unit
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 O5 O6
0 X X X X X kFi [n] kFi [n+ 1]
1 0 X X X X kMi [n] kMi [n+ 1]
1 1 X X X X kIPi [n] kIPi [n+ 1]
A1A2
0
1
2-bit
ROM
2-bit
ROM
2-bit
ROM
0
1
Figure 5.4: The LUT configuration in the key storage unit
The group of 16 slices which stores the three keys is referred to as the
‘key storage unit’. To prevent the design tool from optimising this construction
away, the key storage unit is implemented as a hard macro [80]. When
instantiating the key storage unit, all key bits are initialised to ‘0’. An update
of the keys is achieved through the reconfiguration of the 16 slices of the key
storage unit.
In order to be able to switch between the three keys for the AES decryption
core, the selection inputs A1 and A2 of the multiplexers in Figure 5.4 have to be
altered. To be able to switch between keys through reconfiguration, the same
approach of using a LUT as a 2-bit ROM can be used again. The truth table of
this LUT is shown in Table 5.2. The slice in which this LUT resides is referred
to as the ‘key switching unit’. Upon initialisation, A1 and A2 are forced to ‘0’
because the first key that needs to be offered to the AES core is kFi .
This novel technique of storing the different keys, alters the protocol of changing
between keys. In the original licensing scheme of Maes et al. [41], receiving a
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Table 5.2: Truth table of the LUT in the key switching unit
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 O5 O6
X X X X X X A1 A2
new key happens in a single iteration. This is possible because both kMi and
kIPj are stored in two separate registers. Using the proposed technique requires
two steps for storing a new key: 1) storing the key in the key storage unit and
2) updating the selection bits in the key switching unit.
In the first step, the incoming partial bitstream (containing the new key knew)
is decrypted with the currently used key kactive and forwarded to the ICAP to
update the key storage unit. This has no effect on the value of kactive, used for
decrypting the incoming bitstream, because the key switching unit is not yet
updated.
It is only upon receiving an update of the key switching unit that knew gets used
in the AES core. Naively using the same method as updating the key storage
unit would result in switching the key during decryption of the incoming partial
bitstream. To prevent this, the partial bitstream to update the key switching
unit has to be received, decrypted and temporarily stored before routing it
to the ICAP. Achieving this can be done by adding a FIFO that stores the
decrypted partial bitstream. Because the partial bitstream for updating the key
switching unit (1 slice) is small, the FIFO is small as well.
5.2.4 Novel architecture and tool flow
Novel architecture
The architecture residing in the static partition, handling the licensing scheme,
is depicted in Figure 5.5. The key switching unit sends the selection signals
A1 and A2 to the key storage unit in order to determine which of the three
keys (kFi or kMi or kIPj ) is used in the AES core. The output of the custom
AES core is forwarded through a bit swapper to the ICAP. The bit swapper
makes sure the bits of the decrypted bitstreams are routed in the correct order
to the ICAP. The need for the FIFO is explained in Section 5.2.3. In our
proof-of-concept implementation, encrypted bitstreams are sent to the AES
core over a UART [62]. In an industrial implementation the communication
interface needs to be replaced by an interface with a higher throughput that is
accessible through the Internet.
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key
switching
unit
ICAP
UART
FIFO
bit swapper
2
128
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8 128
key
storage
unit
AES-128
128
32
Figure 5.5: The architecture residing in the static partition, handling the
improved licensing scheme
Figure 5.6 shows a floorplan for the nested partial reconfiguration of the FPGA.
The largest block (Static) consists of all reconfigurable resources on the FPGA.
The two rightmost components are the key switching unit (KSwU) and the
key storage unit (KStU). These units reside in the static partition. The darker
coloured component on the left is a reconfigurable partition (Design), which
holds the design of the system developer. Up until this point there is a single
static partition with a single reconfigurable partition. The IP core which is
acquired for the design of the system developer is a reconfigurable partition as
well, encapsulated in another reconfigurable partition (Design). The difference
compared with the others is that this partition does not reside in the static
partition, but in a reconfigurable partition.
Static
            Design           KStU
       KSwU
         IP core
Figure 5.6: Graphical representation of the nesting levels, where the Static
partition occupies one level; the Design partition, the key storage unit (KStU)
and key switching unit (KSwU) form the first level and the IP core(s) form the
second nesting level.
The evolution of the FPGA architecture in the design phase of the novel
architecture is shown in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.7: The evolution of the novel FPGA architecture during the design
phase. The NVM stores the device key for the on-chip decryption core.
Novel tool flow
Xilinx offers the PlanAhead tool for partial reconfiguration. This tool generates a
partial bitstream for every possible configuration of the static and reconfigurable
partitions. For example, a design with two reconfigurable partitions for which
the first reconfigurable partition has two designs and the second reconfigurable
partition has three designs, ends up with six full bitstreams and six times two
partial bitstreams. Moreover, it is pointed out that nested partial reconfiguration
is not possible with the PlanAhead tool.
To achieve a proof-of-concept implementation for the licensing scheme, the
partial bitstreams are generated with the differential bitstream technique. To
enable the nesting of partial modules, we use the GoAhead tool [2].
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In order to reconfigure the key storage unit and the key switching unit through
partial reconfiguration, these partial bitstreams are generated by making
differential bitstreams with respect to binit and to b(Mi||kiM ), for kMi and
kIPj respectively. To use this technique, first a full bitstream is generated. This
has uninitialised hard macros for the key storage and key switching units. Then,
a second full bitstream is generated, which contains the desired modification
to one of the units. To generate a differential bitstream which only contains
the modifications in the second full bitstream, the final ‘bitgen’ step has to be
rerun, as depicted in Figure 5.8 . Additional parameters11 are applied in the
bitgen step, to make a differential bitstream and indicate the full bitstream
which serves as a reference. With this option, the resulting bitstream only
contains the frames in which the second full bitstream differs from the first full
bitstream. For this reason it is important that no other differences between
these full bitstreams exist.
synthesis build MAP PAR bitgen
.vhdl .ngc .ngd .ncd _routed.ncd .bit
-r referenceFullBitstream.bit
Figure 5.8: The processing steps to obtain a differential bitstream, with the
corresponding file extensions of the bitstream generation process
The full bitstream, binit, is restricted in the area which can be used: only the
‘Static partition’ from Figure 5.6 is available. To achieve this through GoAhead,
the tool applies restrictions on the placement and routing tools to exclude
the usage of the primitives in a certain area. To prevent the placer tool from
using primitives from the restricted area, an additional ‘user constraint file’ is
added. To prevent the routing tool from using connections in the restricted
area, a ‘StaticBlocker’ is used. This blocker is a component that occupies
every restricted net. This blocker is merged with the result of the placer tool.
This ‘_blocked.ncd’ design is then routed by the Xilinx router after which the
‘StaticBlocker’ is removed. The modified chain of processing steps is shown in
Figure 5.9.
The generation of a partial bitstream for the ‘design’, shown in Figure 5.6,
is done by combining the GoAhead approach with the differential bitstream
generation technique. First, a full bitstream is generated that contains the
design. This generation is analogous to the generation of the full bitstream
of the static partition, with a difference in the additional user constraint file
and a substitution of the StaticBlocker by a PartialBlocker. These differences
11In the Xilinx design suite version 14.5, this parameter is ‘-r referenceFullBitstream.bit’.
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synthesis build MAP PAR bitgen
.vhdl .ngc .ngd .ncd
_blocked.ncd
.bit
StaticBlocker.ncd
prohibit.ucf
convert
to .xdl
convert
to .ncd
merge
designs
Unbind 
macro's
remove
blocker _routed.ncd
Figure 5.9: The processing steps through GoAhead to obtain a full bitstream,
with the corresponding file extensions of the bitstream generation process
prevent the placer and routing tools to use resources in the static partition.
Secondly, a differential bitstream is generated between the full bitstream which
only contains the ‘design’ and an empty bitstream. This results in a partial
bitstream which only reconfigures the ‘design’ partition.
The techniques to generate the static and partial bitstreams as explained above,
can be extended to an additional nesting level. For more details and a more
in-depth explanation about generating the full and partial bitstreams using
GoAhead, we refer to the GoAhead documentation [2].
5.2.5 Implementation results
Area
The architecture has been implemented on a Digilent Atlys board, containing
a Xilinx XC6S-LX45 FPGA. The FPGA resources occupied for the execution
of the licensing scheme are shown in Table 5.3. The table illustrates that the
majority of resources is dedicated to the AES core. Since the system developer
needs as much free space as possible for the implementation of his/her own
design in combination with licensed IP cores, the number of remaining resources
available on the FPGA is important. Therefore, the table shows the total number
of relevant FPGA resources we used for our proof-of-concept implementation,
but also for the smallest and the largest member of the Spartan-6 FPGA family.
Although, Table 5.3 shows that the overhead is relatively small, it is still too
large to fit the smallest FPGA family member.
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Table 5.3: Occupied resources by the licensing scheme for different Spartan-6
FPGAs
min clk num of
Occupied 16K DSP period clock duration
slices BRAM 48A1 [ns] cycles1 [ns]
AES 646 0 0 5.00 330 1 650
static 841 4 0
1: number of clock cycles for a single encryption
Available
slices BRAM DSP48A1
XC6SLX4 600 12 8
XC6SLX45 6 822 116 58
XC6SLX150 184 304 268 180
Speed
A full bitstream for the XC6SLX45 has a size of 1 484 514 bytes. The partial
bitstream to update a key in the key storage unit, including padding for
communication and encryption, is 2 232 bytes. The partial bitstream to alter
the output of the key switching unit is 1 432 bytes. In our proof-of-concept
implementation, a UART interface with a baud rate of 115 200 Bd is used. This
results in a duration of 155 ms and 99 ms for the communication of the two
partial bitstreams, respectively. For an update of the key in the key storage
unit, 140 AES decryptions have to be performed, which takes 0.462 ms (at a
speed of 3.3 µs per decryption, as reported in Table 2.13 with a system clock of
100 MHz). For an update of the key switching unit, 90 AES decryptions have
to be performed, which takes 0.297 ms. In total a key update takes 155.462 ms
(155 ms + 0.462 ms) and a key switch takes 99.297 ms (99 ms + 0.297 ms).
In this proof-of-concept implementation, the communication speed forms the
bottleneck. It is clear that a communication channel with a higher bandwidth
is necessary for the practical deployment of the system.
5.3 Results
Although the implementation presented in this chapter is the first working
implementation of a pay-per-use licensing scheme, a number of issues are still
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open for improvement; the most relevant ones are mentioned.
The hardest challenge is the storage of the FPGA key kFi . Storing this key in a
secure and non-volatile way is tough to accomplish. In the solution described
above it is assumed the FPGA has non-volatile memory but that is not a
common nor an inexpensive feature. A solution for this problem might be
obtained from Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [23].
In a proof-of-concept implementation, the slow serial interface used in this
chapter can be used. However, this is not acceptable in an industrial setting.
A communication channel with a higher bandwidth and Internet connectivity
should be included to make the solution usable in a real-life setting. The solution
from Chapter 4 can be used, but its relatively large overhead would affect the
available reconfigurable resources on this smaller device even worse.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter describes a practical evaluation of the licensing scheme presented
by Maes et al. in [41]. Our contribution is threefold: a number of feasibility
and usability issues in the original scheme are tackled, additional improvements
that decrease the area overhead are implemented and a proof-of-concept
implementation of the licensing scheme is obtained.
The novelty in decreasing the area overhead consists of moving the key storage
from the slice flip-flops to the configuration memory. To obtain the proof-of-
concept implementation we used the GoAhead tool in combination with the
differential bitstream generation technique.
Even if this chapter resulted in a proof-of-concept implementation, future work
could improve on this. A side-channel robust implementation of AES with an
authenticated mode of operation is a first possibility. A second is to incorporate
a communication channel with a higher throughput.
This results from this chapter have been submitted to the Journal of
Cryptographic Engineering.

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future work
6.1 Conclusions
This thesis explores options for the implementation of applications containing
security challenges on FPGAs.
The first part of our work consists of the implementation of four cryptographic
primitives on an FPGA. In this part, our most important contribution is the
implementation of an elliptic curve processor (ECP) over prime fields based on
a novel architecture. This resulted in the smallest FPGA implementation at
the time of publication. Another contribution is our design approach, based
on the wrapper component to interface the hardware primitives. This unified
interface makes replacing certain primitives by newer versions or even other
primitives seamless, as is illustrated with multiple implementation variants of
the ECP and AES-128.
In the second part of our work, we use the implemented primitives in three
specific applications.
The first application uses hardware to strengthen a distributed logging scheme.
The added value of the implementation of certain components in hardware is
the reduction of the level of trust that has to be put in the log server. Our work
shows that it is feasible to move the implementation from software to hardware.
We also summarise how the hardware architecture can be altered in order to
outperform the software reference implementation.
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The second presented application shows how a reconfigurable chip in an electronic
device can be updated to prolong the device’s lifetime. We introduce two
architectures, one based on the BisT solution (Board is Trusted) and one based
on the FisT solution (FPGA is Trusted). Next to the minimised occupation
of FPGA resources, our contribution consists of the introduction of additional
features such as: entity authentication, countermeasures against side-channel
analysis attacks, and the possibility of avoiding a trusted third party, both in
the BisT and FisT solutions. In addition, the FisT architecture represents the
first single-chip solution for secure remote configuration of FPGAs.
The last presented application handles the practical difficulties of implementing
a hardware IP core licensing scheme. Our research starts from a theoretical
proposal of a pay-per-use licensing scheme, while our contribution is the
improvement of the scheme towards practical feasibility and minimal resource
occupation. We do this by using a novel storage technique in combination with
an academic design tool. To the best of our knowledge, this implementation is
the first practical implementation of a hardware IP core licensing scheme.
The implementations of these three applications results in a number of
conclusions. A first conclusion is that the use of FPGAs in end products
should be reconsidered. Their reconfigurable nature provides features that are
not feasible in ASICs such as: remote device updates, flexible usage of IP cores,
and shorten time-to-market. With these additional features, the higher unit
cost of FPGAs could be justified. The overhead that comes with these unique
features is still substantial, but with the increasing size of the latest FPGAs
this overhead can be afforded.
Secondly, making an implementation for an application like the remote
reconfiguration of FPGAs and the implementation of the IP licensing scheme,
combines a number of different fields of research. When combining different
fields of research it is a challenge to determine the depth level of each involved
field. These choices heavily depend on the application, both its functionality
and its available budget. Moreover, the number of entities, the level of trust that
is put in each entity, together with the hierarchical structure of these entities
play an important role. On the other hand, the considered threat model also
has a substantial influence on the choices of how deep to go in a certain field of
research. No matter how these parameters turn out, bringing together these
different fields is a challenging endeavour.
A third conclusion is that it is not straightforward to implement one general
solution for cryptographic primitives. Different applications require different
levels of security robustness in their implementations. This lack of design
portability forces us to foresee different implementation variants to meet
the requirements of specific applications. The use of generics in the general
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implementation of primitives contributes in finding the required balance between
occupied resources and throughput.
As a final conclusion, it is clear from this research that not all features, which
are technically possible, are supported in today’s tools. The application in
Chapter 5 illustrates this. Due to convincing economical reasons, FPGA vendors
keep certain aspects of their products private, thus forcing developers to use
their tools, or at least parts of them. This places the vendors in a situation in
which other commercial parties, interested in developing implementation tools,
cannot compete with them.
6.2 Future work
An anonymous statement, states: ‘A design is, what a designer has, when time
and money run out.’. For this work, subsequent research can go more in depth
on the topics presented in this thesis, or can treat broader related topics.
6.2.1 Future work in depth
In the context of Chapter 2, further specialising and optimising the ECP to
narrow the gap with the current state-of-the-art implementations, is a first
direction for follow-up research. This could be done by tailoring the hardware
design on some FPGA-specific features or to dedicated elliptic curves.
A second direction for future work, related to Chapter 3, is the speed-up of
the implemented secure logging scheme, such that it outperforms the software
reference implementation. Also, a design and implementation for the backup
system can be realised.
The results of Chapter 4 might be improved by exploring dedicated features of
new heterogeneous implementation platforms, such as Xilinx’ Zynq platform.
Further, doing an in-depth study on the redundancy in an FPGA bitstream in
combination with the state-of-the-art in data compression, will result in achieving
better compression ratios, improving the FisT solution in Chapter 4. Moreover,
to enable the use of the FisT solution for any given FPGA, allowing a reasonable
static partition, could be obtained by segmenting the single reconfigurable
partition. This reduces the size of the partial bitstream, which lowers the
storage requirements in the static partition.
Another direction to follow from the results of Chapter 4 is to transform
the cryptographic components and the CPU’s instruction memory into
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reconfigurable modules. With this improvement of the static system, the
cryptographic setting can be updated as well. This would be a desirable feature
in devices with FPGAs aiming at a long life-cycle. In such a setting, it might
be expected the cryptographic overhead needs updates.
The use of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) is the next step in securing
the licensing scheme of Chapter 5. Also Chapter 4 would benefit from this to
store the private key.
6.2.2 Future work in breadth
This thesis can serve as a foundation to build larger and/or more industry-ready
applications. It could be used as a starting point to completely implement one
single application, with all accompanying aspects.
The dynamic and partial reconfiguration techniques used in this thesis can also
be used to implement countermeasures for side-channel attacks by randomising
the hardware implementations while maintaining their functionality. This was
first published by Mentens et al. in [46].
Further, this thesis can trigger research on economics. It would be very
interesting to investigate the scale of applications that would economically
benefit from having reconfigurable hardware. Quantising the volume of a product
together with an estimation of the saved costs coming from the benefits of using
reconfigurable hardware, could pinpoint the bottlenecks for the introduction of
reconfigurable hardware in marketable products.
Appendix A
Finite state machines
A.1 ECP FSM
Figure A.1 shows the states and their succession of the FSM, used in the ECP.
idleinit
init2
fetch
decode
load
shift_count
storePC
substr
shift
sloadNbis
sloadN
sloadObis
sloadO
incr
sloadops
sloadres
exec
nop cp2mem_pre
cp2PT_pre
restorePC
jmp
cjmp
dummy
cp2mem cp2pt
done
done2
Figure A.1: States of the ECP FSM
123
124 FINITE STATE MACHINES
A.2 SHAMAC FSM
Figure A.2 shows the states and their succession of the FSM, used in the
Hash/HMAC component.
sLoadBlockI
sLoadBlockILast
sHashBlockIstart
sHashBlockI
sIntermediate0bis
sLoadBlockN
sLoadBlockNLast
sHashBlockNstart
sHashBlockN
sStoreIntermediate
sIdle
sLoadLast
sLoad
sHashStart sHashContinu
sHash
sStore
sDone
sLoadKeyI
sLoadKeyILast
sHashKeyIstart
sHashKeyI
sHashKeyIdone
sIntermediate0
sHashBlockNdone
HASH(message) HASH(keyi)
HASH(message)
sIntermediate1
sLoadKeyO
sLoadKeyOLast
sHashKeyOstart
sHashKeyO
sHashKeyOdone
sIntermediate2
sDone
HASH(keyo)
sLoadIntermediate
sLoadIntermediateLast
sHashTailstart
sHashTail
sStoreResult
HASH(intermediate)
Figure A.2: States of the SHAMAC FSM
Appendix B
ECP source code
CP2MEM 0 0
RESTOREPC 0
EXEC PX ∗ R∗∗2 = DIFFX // P(x , y ) −> Q(x , y , z )
EXEC PY ∗ R∗∗2 = DIFFY
EXEC ZM ∗ ZM = T3
EXEC T3 ∗ ZM = T4
EXEC DIFFX ∗ T3 = QX
EXEC DIFFY ∗ T4 = QY
EXEC ZM + ZERO = Q
RESTOREPC 0
EXEC QX ∗ T1 = T4 // qx , qy , T1(=z^−1)
EXEC QY ∗ T1 = T5 // −> PX, PY ( in T6 , T7)
EXEC T4 ∗ ONE = T6
EXEC T5 ∗ ONE = T7
RESTOREPC
LOAD 35 // qz ^(p−2) −> T1
EXEC QZ + ZERO = T1
EXEC QZ + ZERO = T2
EXEC T1 ∗ T1 = T1
CJMP 21 0 0
EXEC T1 ∗ T2 = T1
SHIFT
CJMP 18 1
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RESTOREPC 0
EXEC QZ ∗ QZ = T1 // 2Q −> S
EXEC T1 ∗ AM = T1
EXEC QX ∗ QX = T2
EXEC T2 + T2 = T3
EXEC T2 + T3 = T3
EXEC T1 + T3 = T1
EXEC QY ∗ QZ = T2
EXEC QX ∗ QY = T3
EXEC T3 ∗ T2 = T3
EXEC T1 ∗ T1 = T4
EXEC T3 + T3 = T5
EXEC T5 + T5 = T6
EXEC T6 + T6 = T5
EXEC T4 − T5 = T4
EXEC T6 − T4 = T5
EXEC T1 ∗ T5 = T5
EXEC T2 ∗ T2 = T6
EXEC T6 + T6 = T6
EXEC T6 + T6 = T6
EXEC T6 + T6 = T6
EXEC QY ∗ QY = T7
EXEC T6 ∗ T7 = T7
EXEC T5 − T7 = SY
EXEC T2 ∗ T6 = SZ
EXEC T2 ∗ T4 = T6
EXEC T6 + T6 = SX
RESTOREPC 0
EXEC SX ∗ QZ = T6 // Q <= S + Q, S <= 2S
EXEC SX ∗ QX = T1
EXEC SZ ∗ QZ = T4
EXEC QX ∗ SZ = T2
EXEC T6 − T2 = T3
EXEC T3 ∗ T3 = QZ
EXEC DIFFX ∗ QZ = T5
EXEC AM ∗ T4 = T7
EXEC T1 + T7 = T1
EXEC T2 + T6 = T2
EXEC T1 ∗ T2 = T1
EXEC T4 ∗ T4 = T2
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EXEC BM ∗ T2 = T7
EXEC T1 + T7 = T1
EXEC T1 + T1 = T1
EXEC T1 − T5 = T5
EXEC T7 + T5 = T5
EXEC T7 + T5 = QX
EXEC AM ∗ T2 = T2
EXEC T6 ∗ T6 = T1
EXEC T1 + T2 = T1
EXEC T2 + T2 = T2
EXEC T1 − T2 = T2
EXEC T2 ∗ T2 = T2
EXEC T6 ∗ T1 = T1
EXEC T4 ∗ T7 = T7
EXEC T1 + T7 = T1
EXEC T6 ∗ T7 = T7
EXEC T7 + T7 = T7
EXEC T7 + T7 = T7
EXEC T7 + T7 = T7
EXEC T2 − T7 = SX
EXEC T4 ∗ T1 = T6
EXEC T6 + T6 = T6
EXEC T6 + T6 = SZ
RESTOREPC 0
EXEC QX ∗ SZ = T6 // S <= Q + S , Q <= 2Q
EXEC QX ∗ SX = T1
EXEC QZ ∗ SZ = T4
EXEC SX ∗ QZ = T2
EXEC T6 − T2 = T3
EXEC T3 ∗ T3 = SZ
EXEC DIFFX ∗ SZ = T5
EXEC AM ∗ T4 = T7
EXEC T1 + T7 = T1
EXEC T2 + T6 = T2
EXEC T1 ∗ T2 = T1
EXEC T4 ∗ T4 = T2
EXEC BM ∗ T2 = T7
EXEC T1 + T7 = T1
EXEC T1 + T1 = T1
EXEC T1 − T5 = T5
EXEC T7 + T5 = T5
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EXEC T7 + T5 = SX
EXEC AM ∗ T2 = T2
EXEC T6 ∗ T6 = T1
EXEC T1 + T2 = T1
EXEC T2 + T2 = T2
EXEC T1 − T2 = T2
EXEC T2 ∗ T2 = T2
EXEC T6 ∗ T1 = T1
EXEC T4 ∗ T7 = T7
EXEC T1 + T7 = T1
EXEC T6 ∗ T7 = T7
EXEC T7 + T7 = T7
EXEC T7 + T7 = T7
EXEC T7 + T7 = T7
EXEC T2 − T7 = QX
EXEC T4 ∗ T1 = T6
EXEC T6 + T6 = T6
EXEC T6 + T6 = QZ
RESTOREPC 0
EXEC DIFFX ∗ QZ = T5 // get QY from
EXEC T5 − QX = T6 // QX, QZ, SX, SZ
EXEC T6 ∗ T6 = T6
EXEC SX ∗ T6 = T6
EXEC T5 + QX = T5
EXEC DIFFX ∗ QX = T7
EXEC QX ∗ QZ = T1
EXEC AM ∗ QZ = T3
EXEC QZ ∗ QZ = T2
EXEC T3 + T7 = T7
EXEC T5 ∗ T7 = T7
EXEC DIFFY ∗ SZ = T5
EXEC T5 + T5 = T5
EXEC T5 ∗ T2 = QZ
EXEC T5 ∗ T1 = QX
EXEC BM ∗ T2 = T2
EXEC T2 + T2 = T2
EXEC T7 + T2 = T7
EXEC SZ ∗ T7 = T7
EXEC T7 − T6 = QY
RESTOREPC 0
ECP SOURCE CODE 129
STOREPC 0 146 // s c a l a r ∗ P −> Q
JMP 24 // 2Q −> S
CJMP 150 0 0
STOREPC 0 149
JMP 51 // Q <= S + Q, S <= 2S
JMP 153
STOREPC 0 152
JMP 87 // S <= Q + S , Q <= 2Q
JMP 153
SHIFT
CJMP 146 1
RESTOREPC 1
LOAD 36 // qz ^(O−2) −> T1
EXEC QZ + ZERO = T1
EXEC QZ + ZERO = T2
EXEC T1 ∗ T1 = T1
CJMP 162 0 0
EXEC T1 ∗ T2 = T1
SHIFT
CJMP 159 1
RESTOREPC 0
EXEC SY ∗ QZ = T1 // Q + S => Q
EXEC QY ∗ SZ = T2
EXEC SX ∗ QZ = T3
EXEC QX ∗ SZ = T4
EXEC T1 − T2 = T5
EXEC T3 − T4 = T6
EXEC QZ ∗ SZ = T7
EXEC T6 ∗ T6 = T8
EXEC T8 ∗ T6 = T9
EXEC T2 ∗ T9 = T2
EXEC T8 ∗ T4 = T1
EXEC T5 ∗ T5 = T3
EXEC T3 ∗ T7 = T3
EXEC T3 − T9 = T3
EXEC T3 − T1 = T3
EXEC T3 − T1 = T3
EXEC T3 ∗ T6 = QX
EXEC T1 − T3 = T1
EXEC T5 ∗ T1 = T1
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EXEC T1 − T2 = QY
EXEC T9 ∗ T7 = QZ
RESTOREPC 0
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP // POINT MULTIPLICATION −−−−−−−−−−
CP2MEM 2 1 // copy X from PT
CP2MEM 3 2 // copy Y from PT
CP2MEM 32 3 // copy s c a l a r from PT
LOADN
LOAD 32
// load s c a l a r
STOREPC 0 207
JMP 2 // P(x , y ) −> Q(X,Y,Z)
STOREPC 1 209
JMP 144 // s c a l a r ∗ P −> Q
STOREPC 0 211
JMP 123 // get QY from
STOREPC 0 213 // QX, QZ, SX, SZ
JMP 15 // qz ^(p−2) −> T1
STOREPC 0 215
JMP 10 // qx , qy , T1(=z^−1)
CP2PT 5 1 // −> PX, PY ( in T6 , T7)
CP2PT 6 2
CP2PT 7 3
CP2PT 16 4
CP2PT 21 5
CP2PT 22 6
END
NOP
NOP // ECDSA VERIFICATION −−−−−−−−−−−−
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LOADO
CP2MEM 46 1 // copy pub l i c key from PT
CP2MEM 47 2
CP2MEM 43 3 // copy r , s and e from PT
CP2MEM 44 4
CP2MEM 45 5
EXEC SIGS ∗ R∗∗2o = QZ // copy s i gS to qz
STOREPC 0 233
JMP 156
// qz ^(O−2) −> T1
EXEC HASH ∗ R∗∗2o = T2
EXEC SIGR ∗ R∗∗2o = T3
EXEC T2 ∗ T1 = T7 // u1M_o −> T7
EXEC T3 ∗ T1 = T8 // u2M_o −> T8
EXEC T7 ∗ ONE = T9 // T7 −> u1 (T9)
EXEC T8 ∗ ONE = T10 // T8 −> u2 (T10)
LOADN
LOAD 25 // load u2
EXEC PUBX + ZERO = PX
EXEC PUBY + ZERO = PY // load Qa −> P
STOREPC 0 245
JMP 2 // P(x , y ) −> Q(X,Y,Z)
STOREPC 1 247
JMP 144 // u2 ∗ Qa
STOREPC 0 249
JMP 123 // get QY from
EXEC QX + ZERO = T11 // QX, QZ, SX, SZ
EXEC QY + ZERO = T12
EXEC QZ + ZERO = T13
LOAD 24 // load u1
EXEC GENX + ZERO = PX
EXEC GENY + ZERO = PY // load G −> P
STOREPC 0 257
JMP 2 // P(x , y ) −> Q(X,Y,Z)
STOREPC 1 259
JMP 144 // u1 ∗ G
STOREPC 0 261
JMP 123 // get QY from
EXEC T11 + ZERO = SX // QX, QZ, SX, SZ
EXEC T12 + ZERO = SY
EXEC T13 + ZERO = SZ
STOREPC 0 266
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JMP 165 // Q + S => Q
STOREPC 0 268
JMP 15 // qz ^(p−2) −> T1
STOREPC 0 270
JMP 10 // qx , qy , T1(=z^−1)
LOADO // −> PX, PY ( in T6 , T7)
EXEC T6 + ZERO = T2
EXEC T2 − SIGR = T3 // v−r
LOAD 18 // c a l c u l a t e l ength o f v−r
CJMP 277 2
EXEC ZERO + ZERO = T1
JMP 279
EXEC ONE + ZERO = T1
JMP 279
CP2PT 21 5
CP2PT 22 6
CP2PT 16 7
END
NOP
NOP // ECDSA GENERATION −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
CP2MEM 32 1 // copy p r i va t e key from PT
CP2MEM 45 2 // copy hash from PT
CP2MEM 51 3
// copy random number from PT
LOADN
LOAD 51
EXEC GENX + ZERO = PX
EXEC GENY + ZERO = PY // load G −> P
STOREPC 0 294
JMP 2 // P(x , y ) −> Q(X,Y,Z)
STOREPC 1 296
JMP 144 // rnd ∗ G
STOREPC 0 298
JMP 123 // get QY from
STOREPC 0 300 // QX, QZ, SX, SZ
JMP 15 // qz ^(p−2) −> T1
STOREPC 0 302
JMP 10 // qx , qy , T1(=z^−1)
LOADO // −> PX, PY ( in T6 , T7)
EXEC T6 + ZERO = SIGR
EXEC RND ∗ R∗∗2o = QZ // copy random to qz
STOREPC 0 307
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JMP 156
// qz ^(O−2) −> T1
EXEC HASH ∗ R∗∗2o = T2
EXEC SIGR ∗ R∗∗2o = T3
EXEC KEY ∗ R∗∗2o = T4
EXEC T3 ∗ T4 = T5
EXEC T5 + T2 = T8
EXEC T1 ∗ T8 = T9
EXEC ONE ∗ T9 = SIGS
CP2PT 21 4
CP2PT 22 5
CP2PT 43 6
CP2PT 44 7
END
NOP

Appendix C
Demonstration
C.1 Introduction
C.1.1 Situating the demonstration
The demonstration illustrates the work of Chapter 4 through ‘a reconfigurable
audiobox’. This audiobox provides three different filters which each can be
bypassed. By using remote reconfiguration, the hardware of these three filters
can be updated. Updating a filter will result in an audible result. An overview
of the setup is given in Figure C.1.
Filter A Filter B Filter C
AC97
overhead
for 
single-chip
remote
reconfig-
uration
Figure C.1: The setup of the demo
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Figure C.1 shows an audio source, which serves as the analogue input for an
AC’97 codec chip [29]. The input is converted to a digital value, which is
a serial input for the FPGA. The FPGA routes this input to the first filter.
The input for the second filter can be chosen, through a multiplexer, to be
the input or the output of the first filter. The input for the third filter can,
analogously, be chosen between the input or the output of the second filter.
Finally, through a third multiplexer, either the input or the output of the third
filter is sent out of the FPGA, to the AC’97 codec chip. After conversion of
the digital output to an analogue output, the audio signal is played through
a speaker. The cryptographic overhead which is required for the single-chip
remote reconfiguration is described in Section 4.2.3.
C.1.2 Filters
Three different filters have been generated: an all-pass filter, a low-pass filter,
and a high-pass filter. A forth filter-like component which can reside in the
reconfigurable partition, is an empty box. Such an empty box is an absence of
any connection or configuration in the partition.
the all-pass filter just routes the input signal to the output
the low-pass filter suppresses frequencies in the signal, above 2 547 Hz
the high-pass filter suppresses frequencies in the signal, below 2 547 Hz
C.2 Implementation
C.2.1 Audio interfacing
The ML507 development board holds an AC’97 codec chip. This chip performs
an analogue-to-digital conversion on the input and the reverse conversion on
the output. Configuring the chip is done through I2C.
For the demonstration, the sampling frequency is 48 kHz and is binary
represented with a 16-bit vector for each channel (left and right). A controlling
component configures the AC’97 codec chip on start-up, it provides two 16-bit
inputs for the left and right channel, and it sends two 16-bit outputs to the
codec chip.
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C.2.2 Filters
The empty box filter and the pass-filter are straightforward. Both other filters
are implemented as first order, infinite impulse response filters. The low pass
filter is implemented as yi = α · xi + (1 − α) · yi−1 where α = ∆T0.25+∆T . The
high pass filter is implemented as yi = α · (xi − xi−1) + (1 − α) · yi−1 where
α = 0.50.5+∆T . Because the sampling frequency is 48 kHz, ∆T is set to 20833 ns,
for both filters.
+
/ 4
/ 2
/ 4
Figure C.2: Low pass filter
+
* -1
/ 2
Figure C.3: High pass filter
C.2.3 Generation of the partial bitstreams
In the first step, the bitstreams for the static partition and the filters are
generated with Xilinx PlanAhead v14. To provide some flexibility in the filters,
three different sizes of reconfigurable areas are implemented. The segmentation
of the reconfigurable fabric is shown in Figure C.4 and Table C.1.
Table C.1: Resource availability for each partition
Slices BRAMs DSPs
Filter A 2 886 32 64
Filter B 720 8 16
Filter C 1 440 16 32
Static 6 154 92 16
XC5VFX70T 11 200 148 128
After the final ‘bitgen’ steps in the toolflow, a large number of bitstreams is
available. In the four full bitstreams, the instruction memory needs to be
initialised with the program that runs on the MicroBlaze. This is described in
Section 3.2.2.
A closer look at the content of the bitstreams shows it contains a header. This
header contains metadata amongst which is the file-name of the bitstream. This
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Figure C.4: The segmentation of the floorplan
variable header is the cause of partial bitstream file sizes which are not dividable
by data width of the ICAP. Therefore, in a second step, this variable header is
discarded. Additionally, the bitstream is pre-padded with 0xFF bytes to make
the file size dividable by the ICAP word size.
In the third step, these trimmed partial bitstreams are encoded, using RLE.
The result of these operations on the file sizes of the partial bitstreams is shown
in Table C.2.
C.2.4 Central Reconfiguration Unit
For the demonstration a standard office-laptop is used as central reconfiguration
unit. This laptop is used to generate the bitstreams and has a number of scripts
which interact with the FPGA. It locally hosts the visualisation website.
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Table C.2: File sizes of the partial bitstreams throughout the generation steps
bitstream file size after
PlanAhead trimming RLE
Filter A empty box 671 986 671 848 24 642
Filter A all-pass 671 989 671 848 26 264
Filter A low-pass 671 989 671 848 30 548
Filter A high-pass 671 989 671 848 32 302
Filter B empty box 168 490 168 352 7 700
Filter B all-pass 168 493 168 352 8 576
Filter B low-pass 168 493 168 352 12 456
Filter B high-pass 168 493 168 352 16 018
Filter C empty box 336 322 336 184 6 196
Filter C all-pass 336 325 336 184 7 206
Filter C low-pass 336 325 336 184 12 206
Filter C high-pass 336 325 336 184 14 416
C.2.5 Visualisation
The visualisation of de demonstration is done through a locally hosted
websiteThis webpage provides an interface to the different steps of the
reconfiguration protocol: the execution of the full STS protocol, the request of
a bitstream validation, and the request for a partial reconfiguration.
Two feedback windows are present to report on the actions of the FPGA and
the local scripts on the laptop. For the FPGA, this feedback is done through a
serial connection which only is available on a demonstration setup.
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Figure C.5: A screenshot of the web-interface of the demo
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